Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Aden Hailu suffered severe lack of brain oxygen damage while she was admitted to St. Mary’s Regional Medical Center. Hailu was placed on ventilation support. After Hailu failed an apnea test, St. Mary’s concluded that Hailu was brain dead and notified Hailu’s father and guardian, Fanuel Gebreyes, that it intended to discontinue Hailu’s ventilator and other life support. Gebreyes filed an emergency petition for temporary restraining order seeking to prevent St. Mary’s from removing Hailu from life-sustaining services. The district court ruled in favor of St. Mary’s. At issue on appeal was whether the American Association of Neurology guidelines (AAN Guidelines) are considered “accepted medical standards” that satisfy the definition of brain death in Nev. Rev. Stat. 451.007. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order denying a petition or temporary restraining order, holding that the district court failed properly to consider whether the AAN Guidelines adequately measure all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, under Nev. Rev. Stat. 451.007 and whether the AAN Guidelines are considered accepted medical standards by the medical community. Remanded. View "In re Guardianship of Hailu" on Justia Law

Appellant was arrested for driving under the influence and submitted to a blood test. Christine Maloney, a forensic scientist, conducted a blood analysis, which revealed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.159. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) notified Appellant that his driver’s license was being revoked, and Appellant requested an administrative hearing to contest the revocation. The administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the DMV established the necessary elements of proof and revoked Appellant’s driver’s license, concluding that Maloney’s affidavit declaring that she was chemist was admissible. Appellant petitioned for judicial review, arguing that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence because Maloney’s affidavit failed to state whether she had been court-qualified as an expert. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Maloney’s affidavit, which failed to state whether she had been qualified in a Nevada court of record, was inadmissible at Appellant’s revocation hearing; and (2) in the affidavit’s absence, the evidence was not sufficiently substantial to revoke Appellant’s driver’s license. View "Valenti v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Respondent brought an action against Appellant for professional negligence relating to services that Appellant performed for Respondent. After Respondent filed a demand for arbitration, Appellant submitted what it claimed to be two statutory offers of judgment. Respondent did not accept either offer. A panel of arbitrators subsequently ruled in favor of Appellant. The order stated that each party would bear its own fees and costs. Appellant filed a motion in the district court to correct the arbitration award to order Respondent to pay Appellant’s attorney fees. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the award of fees and costs by an arbitrator is discretionary even after an offer of judgment is made, Appellant did not demonstrate that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded Nevada law by refusing to award it fees and costs. View "WPH Architecture, Inc. v. Vegas VP, LP" on Justia Law

The State Water Engineer granted the applications of Kobeh Valley Ranch, LLC to change the point of diversion, place of use, and manner of use of other of its existing rights in Eureka County. Eureka County and other appellants holding existing senior rights in Kobeh Valley petitioned the district court for judicial review of the State Engineer’s decision. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the State Engineer’s decision to grant KVR’s applications, when the result of the appropriations would conflict with existing rights, and based upon unsupported findings that mitigation would be sufficient to rectify the conflict, violated the Legislature’s directive that the State Engineer must deny use or change applications when the use or change would conflict with existing rights. View "Eureka County v. State Engineer" on Justia Law

Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. On his claimed exemption schedule, Debtor asserted that, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.090(1)(bb), his entire interest in two corporations’ stock was exempt from the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court certified a question to the Supreme Court, asking whether section 21.090(1)(bb) allows a debtor to exempt his entire interest in a closely held corporation or whether the exemption is limited to the debtor’s noneconomic interest in the corporation. The Supreme Court answered that section 21.090(1)(bb)’s language exempting stock of a corporation described in subsection 2 of Nev. Rev. Stat. 78.746 “except as set forth in that section” means that a debtor can exempt stock in the corporations described in Nev. Rev. Stat. 78.746(2), but his economic interest in that stock can still be subject to the charging order remedy in section 78.746(1). View "Becker v. Becker" on Justia Law

High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Association filed a complaint against D.R. Horton, Inc. alleging breach of implied warranties of workmanlike quality and habitability, breach of contract, breach of express warranties, and breach of fiduciary duty. High Noon moved, ex parte, for a stay and enlargement of time for service of the complaint until the Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 40 prelitigation process for constructional defect cases was complete. The district court granted High Noon’s motion. The Chapter 40 process was still not complete more than eight years later. In these original petitions for extraordinary relief, D.R. Horton argued that the district court erred when it initially granted the ex parte stay and further erred when it denied a motion to dismiss the underlying complaint pursuant to the five-year rule in Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) when the Chapter 40 process was still not complete. The Supreme Court denied both of these petitions for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, concluding (1) the district court’s order granting a stay was not in error; and (2) the five-year period was tolled under the Boren exception to Rule 41(d). View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Cristie Anderson and her husband (together, Plaintiffs) sued Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino (Mandalay) after Alonzo Gonzalez, a Mandalay employee, raped Anderson in her hotel room at Mandalay. Plaintiffs asserted claims for negligent hiring, vicarious liability, and loss of consortium but later abandoned all claims except the vicarious liability claim. The district court granted summary judgment for Mandalay, concluding that it was not reasonably foreseeable that Gonzalez would rape Anderson. The district court also denied, as futile, Anderson’s motion to amend her complaint to add direct negligence claims against Mandalay. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, a reasonable jury could find that Gonzalez’s criminal conduct was reasonably foreseeable; and (2) direct negligence claims against Mandalay would not be futile because a reasonable jury might find that the criminal conduct was foreseeable. Remanded. View "Anderson v. Mandalay Corp." on Justia Law

Wynn Resorts filed a lawsuit against Kazuo Okada, a former member of the board of directors of Wynn Resorts. As part of the discovery process, Wynn Resorts noticed Okada’s deposition for over the course of ten days in Las Vegas even though Okada resides in Hong Kong and owns businesses in Tokyo, Japan. Okada filed a motion for a protective order, asserting that his deposition should presumptively be conducted in Hong Kong or in Tokyo and that the deposition should not exceed three days. The district court denied his motion. Okada filed this writ petition, contending that the district court ignored a common-law presumption that his deposition should take place where he resides that that the district court erred in departing from Nev. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1)’s presumption that depositions should be limited to one day. The Supreme Court denied Okada’s request for writ relief, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) rejecting Okada’s argument regarding the common-law presumption and in determining that Okada failed to demonstrate good cause for having his deposition moved to a location other than Las Vegas; and (2) departing from Rule 30(d)(1)’s presumptive one-day time frame and adopting Wynn Resorts’ ten-day proposal. View "Okada v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After the death of Charles Cornell, Sherry Cornell filed a complaint against numerous defendants, including petitioner Stephen Tam, M.D., alleging medical malpractice. Dr. Tam filed an omnibus motion in limine requesting in part that Plaintiff’s noneconomic damages be capped pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.035, which limits the recovery of a plaintiff’s noneconomic damages in a healthcare provider’s professional negligence action to $350,000. The district court denied the motion, concluding (1) section 41A.035 is unconstitutional, as it violates a plaintiff’s constitutional right to trial by jury; (2) the statutory cap does not apply to the case as a whole, but a separate cap applies to each plaintiff for each of the defendants; and (3) the statutory cap does not apply to medical malpractice claims. Dr. Tam subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the district court to vacate its order denying his motion in limine. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the district court erred in (1) finding the statute unconstitutional; (2) finding the statutory cap applies per plaintiff and per defendant; and (3) finding the statute only applies to professional negligence and not to medical malpractice. View "Tam v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant brought a products liability claim against Respondent, the manufacturer of various models of swimming pool filters for both commercial and residential swimming pools, after he was injured when a filter canister exploded. Appellant alleged that the design of the filter was legally defective and that Respondent failed to give him proper warnings regarding the risk of explosion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent on all claims. Appellant filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The district court denied the motion. Appellant appealed, arguing that, during closing argument, Respondent’s counsel made various impermissible statements that were not based in evidence or that reflected the personal opinion of counsel. Appellant’s counsel did not timely object to any of the disputed statements. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for new trial, holding that attorney misconduct could be deemed to have occurred in this case and that the evidence supporting the products liability verdict was weak. Remanded to the district court for additional findings and with direction for the district court to reconsider its conclusion. View "Michaels v. Pentair Water Pool & Spa" on Justia Law