Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A subordination agreement subordinated a lien for original land financing to a new construction deed of trust. The holder of mechanics’ liens for work performed after the date of the original loan but before the date of the construction deed of trust filed suit. The district court determined that the subordination agreement only partially subordinated the lien for the original land financing to the new construction deed of trust and left the mechanics’ liens in the second-priority position. The holder of the mechanics’ liens petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to vacate its order and recognize its mechanics’ liens as holding a first priority. The Supreme Court denied the petition for extraordinary writ, holding that the priority of the mechanic’s lien remains junior to the amount secured by the original senior lien, as (1) contractual partial subordination differs from complete subordination, and therefore, a contractual partial subordination by creditors of a common debtor do not subordinate a first priority lien to a mechanic’s lien; and (2) nothing in Nev. Rev. Stat. 108.225 changes the priority of a mechanic’s lien to a partially subordinated lien recorded before the mechanic’s lien became effective. View "In re Manhattan West Mechanic's Lien Litig." on Justia Law

Three petitioners sued their former employer and certain of its agents and associates (collectively, “Employer”) asserting minimum wage and overtime claims individually and on behalf of others similarly situated. The district court entered orders compelling individual arbitration of Petitioners’ claims and denying their motions for class certification. Each petitioner signed the same long-form arbitration agreement, which included a clause waiving the right to initiate or participate in class actions. Petitioners sought extraordinary writ relief, contending that Employer’s failure to countersign the long-form agreement made it unenforceable, that the class action waiver violated state and federal law, and, in the case of one petitioner, Employer waived its right to compel arbitration by litigating with him in state and federal court. The Supreme Court denied writ relief, holding that Petitioners’ arguments were unavailing and that the district court did not err in compelling individual arbitration of their claims. View "Tallman v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellants guaranteed a promissory note executed in favor of Respondent, which was secured by land in Arizona. The guaranties were executed in Nevada and contained a Nevada choice-of-law provision. After default on the note, Respondent filed a complaint in Nevada and then initiated foreclosure proceedings in Arizona. Respondent sought a deficiency judgment on the guaranty through its initially filed complaint. The district court concluded that because the property was located in Arizona and sold pursuant to Arizona law, neither Arizona’s nor Nevada’s limitations period applied for seeking a deficiency judgment, and therefore, the deficiency judgment could proceed. Judgment was entered in Respondent’s favor for $929,224. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because of the choice-of-law provision in the promissory note, Nevada law - particularly Nevada’s limitations period - applied in this case; and (2) Respondent failed to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1) because it did not apply for a deficiency judgment within six months of the foreclosure sale, and therefore, the district court erred when it denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. View "Mardian v. Greenberg Family Trust" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Utah-based credit union, loaned an amount of money secured by real property in Mesquite Nevada to Respondents. Respondents later defaulted. Appellant held a trustee’s sale, resulting in a deficiency on the loan balance. Appellant sued Respondents in Clark County to recover the deficiency. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the action under Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), alleging that Appellant could not sue to recover the deficiency in Nevada. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the note and loan agreement contained language clearly expressing the parties’ intent to submit litigation relating to the note and agreement to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. At issue on appeal was whether forum selection clauses in the loan agreement and note were mandatory or permissive. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract clauses stating that the parties shall “submit themselves to the jurisdiction of” Utah were permissive forum selection clauses, and therefore, the district court erred when it found that Utah was the sole forum for any controversy and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Am. First Fed. Credit Union v. Soro" on Justia Law

Stephen Hansen was injured when Brad Aguilar struck Hansen’s vehicle. Hansen sued Aguilar, who was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. State Farm agreed to defend Aguilar under a reservation of rights. Aguilar agreed to a settlement with Hansen in which he assigned his rights against State Farm to Hansen. Hansen filed this action in federal district court alleging, among other claims, that State Farm breached a contract in its representation of Aguilar. The federal district court concluded that State Farm breached its contractual duty to defend Aguilar because it did not provide Aguilar with independent counsel of his choosing. State Farm moved for reconsideration. The federal district court granted the motion in part and certified two questions to the Supreme Court concerning Nevada’s conflict-of-interest rules in insurance litigation. The Supreme Court answered (1) Nevada law requires an insurer to provide independent counsel for its insured when a conflict of interest exists between the insurer and its insured; and (2) an insurer is only obligated to provide independent counsel when an actual of conflict exists, and a reservation of rights letter does not create a per se conflict of interest. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a petition to be appointed the guardian of N.M., a United States citizen who lived in Nevada with Respondent. Appellant, N.M’s mother, lived in Mexico. The district court appointed Respondent as N.M.’s general guardian. A panel of the Supreme Court affirmed the award of custody to Respondent. Appellant then filed this petition for en banc consideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a district court exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction may appoint a general guardian to protect a child in Nevada from mistreatment or abuse pursuant to section 125A.335 when (a) no court in another jurisdiction has entered an applicable custody order or commenced custody proceedings, and (b) Nevada has become the child’s home state; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a guardian. View "In re Guardianship of N.M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against Defendants-medical providers. Before filing suit, Plaintiff consulted with a medical expert from whom he obtained a supporting declaration required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071. Plaintiff, however, did not attach the declaration to the complaint but instead filed the complaint by itself and filed the separately captioned declaration the following morning. Plaintiff’s complaint incorporated the medical expert’s declaration by reference and both were served together on Defendants before the statute of limitations ran. The district court dismissed the malpractice action on the grounds that Plaintiff’s action was defective because it was filed without the expert affidavit supporting its allegations required by section 41A.071. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 41A.071 did not require dismissal under the circumstances of this case. View "Baxter v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

An abuse-and-neglect petition was filed alleging that Joanna T.’s daughter was in need of protection. Joanna moved to set aside the domestic master’s oral recommendation to sustain the abuse-and-neglect petition because Joanna had never received a summons notifying her of the adjudicatory hearing. The juvenile court granted the motion. A summons was served on Joanna 486 days after the abuse-and-neglect petition was filed. Joanna filed a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting that the summons was untimely under Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(i) because it was issued more than 120 days after the abuse-and-neglect petition was filed. The juvenile court denied the petition and later sustained the abuse-and-neglect petition against Joanna. The Supreme Court denied Joanna’s petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, holding that Rule 4(i)’s requirement that a summons be served within 120 days does not apply in chapter 432B proceedings, and therefore, dismissal of the abuse-and-neglect petition was not warranted. View "Joanna T. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The State Engineer cancelled a water permit for failure to comply with its terms. Plaintiff filed a petition for judicial review in the district court under Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.395(2) seeking an order vacating the state Engineer’s decision to cancel the permit. The district court granted the State Engineer’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s petition because Plaintiff sought judicial review before exhausting her available administrative remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 533.395(2) requires a party aggrieved by the cancellation of a water permit to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a petition for judicial review with the district court, even when the remedy that the State Engineer is authorized to provide is not the remedy that the party seeks; and (2) Plaintiff, therefore, should have filed a written request for the State Engineer to review its decision to cancel the water permit at a public hearing before she sought judicial remedies. View "Benson v. State Eng’r" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a law firm, was retained as counsel for a gaming company (“the company”) in a lawsuit against the company’s former employees and an entity they created. Petitioner prepared a second amended complaint adding real parties in interest (collectively, “Himelfarb”) as defendants. The jury rejected the company’s claims against Himelfarb and found for Himelfarb on its counterclaims. The district court eventually determined that the company would be liable for Himelfarb’s attorney fees and costs and determined that Petitioner was jointly and severally liable with the company for those fees and costs pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 7.085. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of mandamus vacating the portion of the district court’s order making Petitioner jointly and severally liable for Himelfarb’s attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) Nev. R. Civ. P. 11 does not supersede section 7.085 because each represents a distinct, independent mechanism for sanctioning attorney misconduct, and therefore, the award against Petitioner was not improper; but (2) the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning Petitioner under section 7.085 without making adequate findings. View "Watson Rounds v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law