Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a self-employed delivery driver who contracted with FedEx Home Delivery for one of its delivery routes, fell and injured his shoulder while delivering packages. Under his FedEx service contract, Appellant was required to maintain workers’ compensation insurance, which he did through CorVel Corporation. Appellant received medical treatment, but with his physical restrictions, he could not complete his delivery route. Appellant hired a replacement driver until he canceled the service contract. Appellant sought temporary disability benefits, which CorVel denied. Appellant administratively appealed. The appeals officer denied both temporary total disability benefits and temporary partial disability benefits on the basis that Appellant could not establish a loss of any income without evidence of a salary. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for self-employed individuals, the lack of a salary associated with typical employment does not preclude an average monthly wage calculation for the purpose of determining lost income and rendering a workers’ compensation benefit decision; and (2) the appeals officer in this case should have determined the best method for calculating any loss to Appellant’s wages resulting from his industrial injury, taking into account both his business’s income and expenses. Remanded. View "Mensah v. CorVel Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of various criminal offenses. During trial, the jury was permitted to hear testimony regarding an out-of-court “show-up” identification during which Defendant was identified by the victims as the perpetrator of the offenses. In addition, the victims testified at trial and identified Defendant in court as one of the perpetrators. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the show-up was improperly conducted in violation of his constitutional due process rights, and (2) he was improperly sentenced as a habitual criminal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) the identification procedure used in this case was not unnecessarily suggestive, and the identification was reliable, and therefore, the trial court did not plainly err by admitting the identification testimony into evidence; and (2) the district court properly exercised its discretion to sentence Defendant as a habitual criminal. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured in a car accident. Appellant obtained a default judgment against both the driver and the owner of the other vehicle. Thereafter, Appellant brought this action under Nev. Rev. Stat. 485.3091, Nevada’s absolute-liability statute, against the owner’s insurer to recover upon the judgment under the insurance policy. The district court entered judgment in favor of the insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in declining to apply section 485.3091 to Appellant’s action, as a statutory third-party claimant can sue the insurer to enforce compliance with the statute; (2) properly dismissed Appellant’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the statute provides no express language that permits a third-party claimant to pursue an independent bad faith claim against an insurer; and (3) did not err in not awarding Appellant damages based upon a promissory estoppel theory. View "Torres v. Nev. Direct Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellants filed a promissory note that was secured by a deed of trust on their property. At the time that Appellants defaulted, Respondent was the holder of the note and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) was the beneficiary of the deed of trust securing the note. After Appellants filed for bankruptcy, MERS assigned its interest in the deed of trust to Respondent. Before the assignment was recorded, Respondent filed a proof of claim in Appellants’ bankruptcy claiming that it was a secured creditor. Respondent then filed a motion for relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay so that it could foreclose on Appellants’ property. Appellants argued that Respondent was not a secured creditor because it did not have a unified note and deed of trust when the bankruptcy petition was filed. The United States Bankruptcy Court certified two questions of law to the Supreme Court concerning the legal effect on a foreclosure when the promissory note and deed of trust are split at the time of foreclosure. The Supreme Court concluded (1) when the promissory note is held by a principal and the beneficiary under the deed of trust is the principal’s agent at the time of foreclosure, reunification of the note and the deed of trust is not required to foreclose; and (2) as a matter of law, the recording of an assignment of a deed of trust is a ministerial act. View "In re Montierth" on Justia Law

In 1996, the developer of Double Diamond Ranch Master Association (Association) entered into a maintenance agreement with the City of Reno. In 2012, the Association gave notice to the City that it was terminating the contract pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3105(2), which permits a homeowners’ association that provides at least ninety days’ notice to terminate “any contract…that is not in good faith or was unconscionable to the units’ owners at the time entered into.” The City rejected the Association’s notice of termination. Approximately twenty months later, the City brought an action against the Association seeking specific performance of the maintenance agreement. The Association filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that section 116.3105(2) required the City to file suit within ninety days. The district court denied the Association’s motion to dismiss. The Association subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the district court to vacate its order denying the Association’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that section 116.3105(2) does not act as a statute of limitations, and a recipient of an association’s notice of termination of a contract is not required to take legal action within ninety days. View "Double Diamond Ranch Master Ass’n v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, child abuse and neglect with the use of a deadly weapon, and two counts of child abuse and neglect. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial. The district court granted the motion. The State appealed from the order granting the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court ordered the State to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Court held in State v. Lewis that Nev. Rev. Stat. 177.015(1)(b) only permits appeals from district court orders resolving post-conviction motions for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the State’s appeal from an order granting a prejudgment motion for a new trial, holding (1) the plain language of section 177.015(1)(b) clearly authorizes an appeal from a prejudgment order granting a motion for a new trial; and (2) Lewis is overruled to the extent that it prohibits the State from pursuing its statutory right to appeal a prejudgment order granting a motion for a new trial. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a divorce between Mark Anderson and Sophia Sanchez. At the conclusion of mediation, the parties executed a written Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that awarded certain property in California (“The Wilson property”) to Mark in exchange for the payment of a portion of his retirement funds to Sophia. Mark subsequently sought to set aside the MOU and moved for joinder of his sister, Cheryl Parr, arguing that the MOU was void because it improperly distributed property that did not belong to Mark and Sophia because Cheryl had an ownership interest in the Wilson property. The district court denied Mark’s requests, concluding that the MOU was a valid and binding agreement, that Cheryl lacked standing to intervene, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to allow her to intervene. The court then entered a decree of divorce dissolving Mark and Sophia’s marriage and incorporating the MOU. The Supreme Court vacated the divorce decree only as it affected the disposition of the Wilson property, holding that the district court improperly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to join Cheryl in the divorce proceeding and should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to decide the joinder issues before the court adjudicated the parties’ property pursuant to the settlement agreement. Remanded. View "Anderson v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of sexually assaulting a minor under fourteen years of age. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court committed structural error requiring reversal when it failed to administer an oath to the jury venire, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 16.030(5), prior to commencing voir dire. The Supreme Court agreed with Defendant and reversed, holding (1) a district court commits structural error when it fails to administer the oath to potential jurors pursuant to section 16.030(5); and (2) therefore, Defendant in this case was denied due process and was entitled to a new trial. View "Barral v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants guaranteed two commercial loans that loans were eventually assigned to Bank. When the properties securing the commercial loans were foreclosed, Bank brought a breach of guaranty action against Appellants. At issue at trial was the application of Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which reduces the amount of some deficiency judgments. The district court concluded that section 40.459(1)(c) would be retroactive if applied to Appellants’ loans because the statute took effect after the loans were assigned and that Appellants were therefore liable for the full deficiency. The Supreme Court subsequently published Sandpointe Apartments v. Eighth Judicial District Court, which held that section 40.459(1)(c) is prospective if there has been no foreclosure sale on the underlying loan as of the date the statute was enacted. The foreclosure sale in this case occurred more than two months after section 40.459(1)(c) took effect. The Fords filed a motion pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) asking the district court to set aside the judgment against them. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rule 60(b)(5) is not an appropriate avenue for seeking relief based on new or changed precedent, even if enforcement might be inequitable. View "Ford v. Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Toni Sanders and her husband sued Risa Sears-Page for negligence after Sears-Page hit Sanders’ car. At issue during trial was whether the accident had caused or contributed to Toni’s injury and, if so, whether Sanders’ claimed medical expenses were reasonable. The jury unanimously found for Sears-Page. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court committed reversible error in (1) failing to strike a certain juror for cause where the juror’s statements suggested bias and he did not unequivocally state he could be impartial; (2) requiring the parties to issue their challenges for cause while the juror at issue was present; (3) admitting a certain exhibit into evidence because it was not properly authenticated; and (4) allowing Sears-Page’s medical expert to testify to an undisclosed opinion regarding the exhibit at issue. Remanded for a new trial. View "Sanders v. Sears-Page" on Justia Law