Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary while in possession of a firearm, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon. Because he was non-native English speaker, Defendant asked on appeal that the Supreme Court adopt the test set forth by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Garibay to find that his confession should not have been admitted at trial because he was not provided with the assistance of an interpreter during his police interrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed after declining to adopt the Garibay test as an comprehensive inquiry that always must be applied by district courts whenever an interrogated suspect is a non-native English speaker, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that Appellant’s confession was admissible; (2) the district court did not err in admitting documents proffered to tie Defendant to the scene; and (3) the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to sustain the convictions of kidnapping and robbery arising from the same course of conduct. View "Gonzales v. State" on Justia Law

Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.4406, a customer generally must exercise reasonable promptness in examining a bank statement and within thirty days notify the bank of any unauthorized transactions. Plaintiff, a law firm, sued Bank of America after discovering that the firm’s employee had used unauthorized signatures to withdraw funds from the firm’s operating account with the bank. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bank of America, concluding that all claims were time-barred under section 104.4406 because there was no dispute that the bank statements received by the firm were sufficient to notify it of the unauthorized activity on the firm’s account. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) genuine issues of material fact remained as to the delivery method of the bank statements, the content of online and received-in-branch statements, and Bank of America’s exercise of due care in paying certain unauthorized transactions; and (2) unauthorized account transactions that occur within the one-year period before the customer gives notice to the bank are not time-barred under section 104.4406(6)’s one-year period of repose because the statute does not differentiate between a single forgery and multiple forgeries by the same wrongdoer, and therefore, the one-year period of repose begins to run with each successive forgery. View "C. Nicholas Pereos, Ltd. v. Bank of Am." on Justia Law

As stipulated, a child custody decree gave Mother and Father joint legal custody of their minor son and awarded Mother primary physical custody. The decree granted Father unsupervised visitation but specified that visitation could not occur in Africa where Father lived and worked. The decree also included a provision that forbade either parent from traveling with the child outside the United States absent court order or both parents’ consent. A divided three-judge panel affirmed. The Supreme Court granted en banc reconsideration and affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, without specific findings to connect the child’s best interests to the restrictions imposed, the travel and visitation restrictions could not stand. View "Davis v. Ewalefo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for various torts after she fell at a hotel owned by Defendant. Defendant filed a demand for security of costs pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.130. More than six months later, Plaintiff filed the required security with the court clerk. Nine days after Plaintiff filed her bond, Defendant moved the court to dismiss the case pursuant to section 18.130(4). The district court subsequently dismissed the case because Plaintiff filed her bond well outside of thirty days of receiving notice that security was required. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abuses its discretion by dismissing the case if the plaintiff has filed the required security at any time before the court dismisses the case. Remanded. View "Biscay v. MGM Resorts Int'l" on Justia Law

Some independent contractors are immune from liability with regard to a person injured in the course of employment under the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statutes. At issue in this case was when an independent contractor’s actions are within the scope of a major or specialized repair so as to prevent it from claiming immunity from liability as a statutory employer or coemployee. Respondent was injured during the course of his employment by a tire technician for Appellant, a commercial tire retailer. Respondent filed a personal injury claim against Appellant. Appellant moved for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that it was a statutory employee and thus immune from liability. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because there was sufficient evidence that the tire technician was an independent contractor at the time he caused Respondent’s injury, Appellant was not immune from liability for Respondent’s injury; and (2) the district court did not err in refusing to give an incomplete “mere happening” jury instruction because to do so would have been duplicative and/or confusing. View "D & D Tire v. Ouellette" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.241 affords the target of a grand jury investigation the opportunity to testify before them. To facilitate exercise of that right, the statute requires that the target be given reasonable notice of the grand jury proceeding unless, after holding a closed hearing on the matter, the district court determines that adequate cause exists to withhold target notice. In this case, as grounds for withholding target notice from Defendant, the district attorney filed a written request and supporting affidavit asserting that Defendant would threaten or harm the victim and/or her family to prevent the victim from testifying. The district judge supervising the grand jury entered an order authorizing the State to withhold target notice without conducting a face-to-face hearing. The district judge to whom the criminal case was assigned after the indictment was entered granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the failure to hold the hearing rendered the indictment procedurally defective. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 172.241’s procedure for withholding notice is met if the State presents sufficient evidence to the district court, through written application and/or at oral argument, to allow the court to conclude by written order that adequate cause to withhold notice of the grand jury proceedings exists. View "State v. Beaudion" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and related crimes. Defendant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by admitting testimony related to cell phone records and cell phone signal transmissions because, even though the State did not notice as an expert the cell phone company employee, who gave testimony relating to the transmission of cell phone signals, the error did not require reversal of the judgment of conviction; (2) the district court erroneously instructed the jury that the State had the burden of proving the “material elements” of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt without defining “material elements,” but the instruction did not warrant reversal; and (3) Defendant’s prior conviction for attempted battery with substantial bodily harm did not constitute a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another for purposes of the aggravating circumstance set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.033(2)(b), but the jury’s consideration of this invalid aggravating circumstance did not warrant reversal of the death sentence. View "Burnside v. State" on Justia Law

Krista Gilmore was employed by Excellence Community Management (ECM), an LLC, and signed an employment agreement containing restrictive covenants. The owners and operators of ECM later sold 100 percent of their membership interest in the LLC to First Services Residential Management Nevada (FSRM). Thereafter, Gilmore’s employment with ECM terminated, and Gilmore began working for Mesa Management, LLC. ECM sent Gilmore a cease-and-desist letter alleging that Gilmore violated her employment agreement by contacting ECM’s clients and soliciting them to hire Mesa. ECM filed a complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief against Gilmore and Mesa (collectively, Respondents). The district court denied ECM’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the agreement was not assignable to FSRM without Gilmore consenting to the assignment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sale of 100 percent of the membership interest in an LLC does not affect the enforcement of an employee’s employment contract containing a restrictive covenant because such a sale does not create a new entity, and therefore, ECM may enforce a restrictive covenant in Gilmore’s employment contract without Gilmore’s consent of assignment; but (2) ECM failed to show that it would suffer irreparable harm for which compensatory damages were not an adequate remedy if the district court did not enter a preliminary injunction. View "Excellence Cmty. Mgmt. v. Gilmore" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Appellant was sentenced to death. Appellant filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus that was untimely and successive. The district court dismissed the petition as procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the petition, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus where (1) Appellant failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse his procedurally barred post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was actually innocent of either the crime or the death penalty. View "Lisle v. State" on Justia Law

Ad America owned commercial rental property. When Ad America’s tenants were informed that Ad America’s property would be acquired for Project Neon, a freeway improvement project, Ad America’s net rental income decreased, and Ad America could no longer meet its mortgage requirements. Ad America filed an inverse condemnation action against Nevada’s Department of Transportation (NDOT), the lead agency for Project Neon, seeking precondemnation damages for alleged economic harm and just compensation for the alleged taking of its property. The district court granted summary judgment for Ad America even though NDOT had not physically occupied Ad America’s property or taken any formal steps to commence eminent domain proceedings against Ad America’s property. At issue on appeal was whether a taking occurred where NDOT publicly disclosed its plan to acquire Ad America’s property to comply with federal law, the City of Las Vegas independently acquired property that was previously a part of Project Neon, and the City rendered land-use application decisions conditioned on coordination with NDOT for purposes of Project Neon. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, holding that the undisputed material facts, as a matter of law, did not demonstrate that NDOT committed a taking of Ad America’s property warranting just compensation. View "State Dep’t of Transp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law