Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Rolland Weddell and nonparty Michael Stewart were former business partners. When disputes arose between the partners, they agreed to informally settle their disputes by presenting them to a panel of attorneys (Respondents). Respondents issued a decision resolving the parties’ disputes that was largely favorable to Stewart. Thereafter, Stewart filed suit against Appellant seeking a declaratory judgment that Respondents’ decision was valid and enforceable. Appellant proceeded to confess judgment. Appellant later filed this action against Respondents asserting causes of action stemming from Respondents’ conduct in the dispute-resolution process. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint contending that dismissal was warranted on claim preclusion principles. The district court granted the motion, finding that the three factors for claim preclusion articulated by the Supreme Court in Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby had been satisfied. The Supreme Court affirmed after modifying the privity requirement established in Five Star to incorporate the principles of nonmutual claim preclusion, holding that because Respondents established that they should have been named as defendants in Stewart’s declaratory relief action and Appellant failed to provide a good reason for not doing so, claim preclusion applied in this case. View "Weddell v. Sharp" on Justia Law

Father John Feeney was employed as a priest by the Catholic Diocese of Green Bay, a religious organization incorporated and headquartered in Wisconsin. Feeney later came to the Diocese of Reno-Las Vegas. John Doe 119 alleged that Feeney sexually assaulted him during Feeney’s time in Las Vegas and sued the Diocese of Green Bay for negligently hiring and retaining Feeney and for failing to warn others that Feeney was a danger to children. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the Diocese and returned a verdict in favor of Doe on the negligence claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Feeney was not the agent of the Diocese of Green Bay during his ministry in Las Vegas; and (2) the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Diocese because the Diocese did not have sufficient contacts with Nevada. View "Catholic Diocese of Green Bay v. John Doe 119" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of incest, four counts of sexual assault with a minor under the age of fourteen, and two counts of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a jury verdict finding Appellant guilty of incest and sexual assault with a minor; (2) the district court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to admit evidence of the victim’s prior sexual knowledge, but the error was harmless; (3) the district court erred by refusing to give Appellant’s proposed inverse instruction, but the error was harmless; and (4) the district court did not err by denying Appellant’s Batson challenges. View "Guitron v. State" on Justia Law

Jonathan Piper, who was convicted and imprisoned for burglary, was transferred to Casa Grande Traditional Housing, which was operated by Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) for offenders participating in NDOC’s work release program, to serve out the remainder of his sentence. Washworks Rainbow, LLC hired Piper to work at its car wash. Piper was severely injured during the course of his employment. York Claims Services, Inc., Washworks’ workers’ compensation insurance provider, denied coverage, asserting that NDOC was financially responsible for Piper’s workers’ compensation coverage under its own insurance program. An appeals officer found York liable for Piper’s workers’ compensation coverage. The district court set aside the decision of the appeals officer, concluding that NDOC was responsible for Piper’s workers’ compensation coverage pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 616B.028(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 616B.082(1) does not apply to offenders like Piper, who are participating in the work release program. View "Nev. Dep't of Corr. v. York Claims Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary, battery with intent to commit a crime with a victim sixty years of age or older, and robbery with a victim sixty years of age or older. During jury deliberations, the jury gave the court a note indicating that it was deadlocked. The jury was instructed to come back the next day and continue deliberating. The court failed to inform the parties of the note until the next day after the jury returned its verdict. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court’s failure to notify and seek input from the parties after receiving the jury’s note that it was deadlocked constituted constitutional error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court violated Defendant’s due process rights by responding to the note from the jury without notifying the parties or counsel; but (2) the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Manning v. State" on Justia Law

Due to his behavioral problems, Appellant, then a minor, signed a “behavior contract,” under which he consented to random searches of his person and property in order to attend public high school. During a subsequent search of Appellant, a teacher found marijuana on Appellant’s person. Appellant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. Appellant objected to the admission of evidence resulting from the search. The hearing master declined to suppress on the grounds that Appellant had consented to the search under the behavior contract. The district court then formally adjudicated Appellant a delinquent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State failed to demonstrate that Appellant’s consent to search was voluntary, as there was no evidence on the record that additional public education options were available to Appellant, and the State could not constitutionally condition Appellant’s access to a public education on his waiver of his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) therefore, the district court should have suppressed the fruits of the administration’s search of Appellant. View "In re L.A.W." on Justia Law

Appellants borrowed money from Colonial Bank and granted the bank a security interest in their real property. The FDIC assigned Appellants’ loan to Branch Banking and Trust Company, Inc. (BB&T) after placing Colonial into receivership. After Appellants defaulted on their loan, BB&T instituted an action for a judicial foreclosure of the secured property. Two years later, Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which implements certain limitations on the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by an assignee creditor, became effective. After the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale, BB&T filed a motion seeking a deficiency judgment against Appellants for the remaining balance of the loan. The district court awarded a deficiency judgment to BB&T, finding that section 40.459(1) did not apply to BB&T’s application for a deficiency judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that section 40.459(1)(c) was preempted by the federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) to the extent that section 40.459(1)(c) limits deficiency judgments that may be obtained from loans transferred by the FDIC, as section 40.459(1)(c) conflicts with FIRREA’s purpose of facilitating the transfer of the assets of failed banks to other institutions. View "Munoz v. Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Respondent borrowed nearly $17 million from Appellant’s predecessor-in-interest. The loan was secured by real property located in Texas. The Guarantors entered into a guaranty agreement to pay any debt remaining if Respondent defaulted. When Respondent defaulted, the Texas property was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale under Texas law. Appellant then sought a deficiency judgment against Respondent and the Guarantors under Nevada law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent and the Guarantors, finding that Appellant’s nonjudicial foreclosure in Texas did not comply with the terms of Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.080. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1), which permits a creditor or deed-of-trust beneficiary to bring an action for a deficiency judgment after the foreclosure sale or trustee’s sale held pursuant to section 107.080, does not preclude a deficiency judgment in Nevada when the nonjudicial foreclosure sale upon property located in another state is conducted pursuant to that state’s laws instead of section 107.080. Remanded. View "Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Windhaven & Tollway, LLC" on Justia Law

A former patient of Dr. Ryan Mitchell, through his guardian ad litem, sued Mitchell for medical malpractice, alleging that Mitchell’s misadministration of anesthesia during a tonsillectomy caused the seven-year-old patient’s heart to fail. Mitchell admitted that at the time he operated on the patient he was addicted to Ketamine and Valium. During discovery, Plaintiff subpoenaed Mitchell’s counseling and substance abuse treatment records. Mitchell objected, citing the doctor-patient and family therapist-client privileges. The district court overruled Mitchell’s claims. Mitchell sought an extraordinary writ directing the district court to protect as privileged the records relating to his substance abuse. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ, holding (1) Mitchell’s family and marital therapy records were privileged; and (2) Mitchell’s doctor-patient records, though subject to the statutory patient-litigant exception, should have been reviewed in camera by the district court and appropriate limitations placed on their use before discovery of them was allowed. View "Mitchell v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Acting in their official capacities as Justices of the Peace, Respondents petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus to compel Sheriff Allen Veil to enter information from all arrest warrants delivered to the Sheriff’s Office into the databases. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 248.100(1)(c), which requires sheriffs to “execute” warrants, imposed on Sheriff Veil a duty to enter warrant information into electronic databases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 248.100(1)(c) neither contemplates nor imposes such a duty on sheriffs. View "Veil v. Bennett" on Justia Law