Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Due to his behavioral problems, Appellant, then a minor, signed a “behavior contract,” under which he consented to random searches of his person and property in order to attend public high school. During a subsequent search of Appellant, a teacher found marijuana on Appellant’s person. Appellant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. Appellant objected to the admission of evidence resulting from the search. The hearing master declined to suppress on the grounds that Appellant had consented to the search under the behavior contract. The district court then formally adjudicated Appellant a delinquent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State failed to demonstrate that Appellant’s consent to search was voluntary, as there was no evidence on the record that additional public education options were available to Appellant, and the State could not constitutionally condition Appellant’s access to a public education on his waiver of his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) therefore, the district court should have suppressed the fruits of the administration’s search of Appellant. View "In re L.A.W." on Justia Law

Appellants borrowed money from Colonial Bank and granted the bank a security interest in their real property. The FDIC assigned Appellants’ loan to Branch Banking and Trust Company, Inc. (BB&T) after placing Colonial into receivership. After Appellants defaulted on their loan, BB&T instituted an action for a judicial foreclosure of the secured property. Two years later, Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which implements certain limitations on the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by an assignee creditor, became effective. After the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale, BB&T filed a motion seeking a deficiency judgment against Appellants for the remaining balance of the loan. The district court awarded a deficiency judgment to BB&T, finding that section 40.459(1) did not apply to BB&T’s application for a deficiency judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that section 40.459(1)(c) was preempted by the federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) to the extent that section 40.459(1)(c) limits deficiency judgments that may be obtained from loans transferred by the FDIC, as section 40.459(1)(c) conflicts with FIRREA’s purpose of facilitating the transfer of the assets of failed banks to other institutions. View "Munoz v. Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Respondent borrowed nearly $17 million from Appellant’s predecessor-in-interest. The loan was secured by real property located in Texas. The Guarantors entered into a guaranty agreement to pay any debt remaining if Respondent defaulted. When Respondent defaulted, the Texas property was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale under Texas law. Appellant then sought a deficiency judgment against Respondent and the Guarantors under Nevada law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent and the Guarantors, finding that Appellant’s nonjudicial foreclosure in Texas did not comply with the terms of Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.080. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1), which permits a creditor or deed-of-trust beneficiary to bring an action for a deficiency judgment after the foreclosure sale or trustee’s sale held pursuant to section 107.080, does not preclude a deficiency judgment in Nevada when the nonjudicial foreclosure sale upon property located in another state is conducted pursuant to that state’s laws instead of section 107.080. Remanded. View "Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Windhaven & Tollway, LLC" on Justia Law

A former patient of Dr. Ryan Mitchell, through his guardian ad litem, sued Mitchell for medical malpractice, alleging that Mitchell’s misadministration of anesthesia during a tonsillectomy caused the seven-year-old patient’s heart to fail. Mitchell admitted that at the time he operated on the patient he was addicted to Ketamine and Valium. During discovery, Plaintiff subpoenaed Mitchell’s counseling and substance abuse treatment records. Mitchell objected, citing the doctor-patient and family therapist-client privileges. The district court overruled Mitchell’s claims. Mitchell sought an extraordinary writ directing the district court to protect as privileged the records relating to his substance abuse. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ, holding (1) Mitchell’s family and marital therapy records were privileged; and (2) Mitchell’s doctor-patient records, though subject to the statutory patient-litigant exception, should have been reviewed in camera by the district court and appropriate limitations placed on their use before discovery of them was allowed. View "Mitchell v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Acting in their official capacities as Justices of the Peace, Respondents petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus to compel Sheriff Allen Veil to enter information from all arrest warrants delivered to the Sheriff’s Office into the databases. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 248.100(1)(c), which requires sheriffs to “execute” warrants, imposed on Sheriff Veil a duty to enter warrant information into electronic databases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 248.100(1)(c) neither contemplates nor imposes such a duty on sheriffs. View "Veil v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Appellant was employed by Employer at a store located on property owned by Casino (Employer and Casino henceforth referred to as “Casino”). Appellant was engaged to Fiancé when Fiancé filed a complaint with the Nevada Gaming Control Board (NGCB) regarding some of Casino’s slot machines. Casino subsequently terminated Appellant’s employment. Appellant filed suit against Casino alleging that Casino terminated her employment in retaliation for Fiancé’s complaint to the NGCB. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim because Nevada has not recognized a cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge. The Supreme Court affirmed, thus declining to recognize a common law cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge, holding that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Brown v. Eddie World, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, then a teacher for the Washoe County School District (WCSD), pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana in his residence. Before Appellant completed his probation, the WCSD terminated his employment for immorality and conviction of a felony or of a crime involving moral turpitude. Appellant sought unemployment benefits. The Employment Security Division (ESD) denied benefits, finding that Appellant’s guilty plea established that the WCSD had terminated him for “workplace misconduct.” Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.3363, certain first-time drug offenders may avoid a criminal conviction if the offender pleads guilty and then successfully completes a probationary period, after which time the charges are dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that unemployment benefits for workplace misconduct were erroneously denied where the WCSD relied on a felony conviction that didn’t exist to establish that Appellant committed disqualifying misconduct for which he was terminated. View "Hohenstein v. State, Employment Sec. Div." on Justia Law

Coyote Springs Investment, LLC and BrightSource Energy, Inc. entered into a lease. One year later, BrightSource sought to terminate the lease. Coyote Springs sued BrightSource, claiming that the lease’s termination was ineffective without payment of the termination fee. Before trial, the parties deposed Harvey Whittemore, the former co-owner and manager of Coyote Springs. During the deposition, Coyote Springs requested a recess in order to conduct a private conference with Whittemore. The trial commenced, and during cross-examination of Whittemore, BrightSource’s counsel inquired as to what was discussed at the deposition conference. Coyote Springs objected based on attorney-client privilege. The trial court overruled the objection, determining that the communication was not privileged. Coyote Springs petitioned for extraordinary writ relief on the deposition issue. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the communications between Whittemore and counsel for Coyote Springs during the break in Whittemore’s deposition were discoverable because Coyote Springs requested the recess in the deposition and failed to make a sufficient, contemporaneous record of the conference so as to preserve the attorney-client privilege. View "Coyote Springs Inv., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. In the first case, Defendant received the maximum possible sentence. In the second case, Defendant again received the maximum possible sentence. The district court ordered that the second sentence be served consecutively to the sentence previously imposed in the first case. At issue on appeal was Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.035(1), which expressly permits a district court to order that a sentence for a first felony offense when a defendant has already been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for another felony offense, be imposed either concurrently or consecutively to the first sentence. Defendant asserted that section 176.035(1) was unconstitutional because it affords “virtually unfettered discretion” to the district court to determine whether sentences for separate offenses should be imposed concurrently or consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that section 176.035(1) is not unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the federal and state Constitutions, as the statute is comprehensible to persons of ordinary intelligence. View "Pitmon v. State" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were two mining companies. Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court alleging that Defendant owed it royalty payments under an area-of-interest provision in a 1979 commercial mining agreement. Defendant argued that it did not owe royalties because the area-of-interest provision was void under the rule against perpetuities. Plaintiff countered that the rule does not apply to area-of-interest royalty agreements. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant based on the rule against perpetuities. Plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Court answered that Nevada’s common-law rule against perpetuities does not extend to area-of-interest royalties created by commercial mining agreements. View "Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc." on Justia Law