Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Borrower took out a loan from the predecessor-in-interest of Bank. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on certain property and personally guaranteed by Guarantor. After Borrower defaulted and Guarantor failed to fulfill his obligations, Bank instituted an action seeking a receiver to collect rents from and to sell the secured property. The district court approved the request. The receiver (Receiver) subsequently entered into a purchase and sale agreement with a third-party purchaser (Purchaser). The district court approved the sale, and Purchaser paid the agreed-upon price and obtained the deed to the property. Bank then filed a complaint seeking to recover the amount of Guarantor’s indebtedness that the net proceeds that the sale did not satisfy. Borrower and Guarantor (together, Respondents) moved for summary judgment, arguing that the relief sought was in essence an application for a deficiency judgment under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1), which Bank was precluded from seeking because Bank failed to comply with section 40.455(1)’s time frame. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 40.455(1) applied in this case; and (2) Bank’s application for a deficiency judgment was timely. Remanded. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Palmilla Dev. Co." on Justia Law

CenturyLink, a private telecommunications provider, contracted with Clark County to provide inmate telephone services for the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) and to make records of the inmates’ calls available to the governmental agency operating the jail. Blackjack Bonding, Inc. made a public records request to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), the governmental entity that runs the CCDC, seeking records regarding calls to all telephone numbers listed on the various bond agent jail lists posted in CCDC for certain years. LVMPD denied the request. Blackjack then sought mandamus relief to compel LVMPD to provide the requested records. The district court (1) granted in part Blackjack’s request, stating that the requested records were public records that LVMPD had a duty to produce; and (2) denied Blackjack’s motion for attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting in part Blackjack’s petition for a writ of mandamus, as the requested information was a public record subject to LVMPD’s legal custody or control; and (2) abused its discretion by refusing to award reasonable attorney fees and costs to Blackjack. View "LVMPD v. Blackjack Bonding" on Justia Law

In an effort to foreclose on real property that was used to secure a debt by Appellant, Respondent recorded a notice of a trustee’s sale. Respondent orally postponed the sale three times before the property was sold. Thereafter, Respondent initiated a civil action against Appellant. Appellant filed counterclaims against Respondent, claiming that Respondent violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.082(2) when it thrice postponed the sale without effectuating a written notice of the sale’s time and place. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that the three oral postponements did not trigger section 107.082(2)’s notice requirement because the sale occurred on the date set by the third oral postponement. The district court subsequently granted Respondent attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting summary judgment, as Respondent was not required to give notice under section 107.082(2) because the time or place of the trustee’s sale was not changed subsequent to the third oral pronouncement; and (2) awarding attorney fees and costs to Respondent. View "JED Prop. v. Coastline RE Holdings NV Corp." on Justia Law

An attorney and his law firm (collectively, Attorney) filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief challenging a district court order adjudicating attorney liens and distributing settlement funds in a personal injury action. Attorney’s former client (Client) was the real party in interest. Attorney had also filed a separate contract action against Client and others seeking to enforce an alleged fee-sharing agreement. After Attorney received Client’s answer, it decided to pursue the contract action rather than writ relief and filed a motion to dismiss the writ petition. Client opposed the motion, asking that if the Supreme Court did not resolve the petition on the merits, it require Attorney to pay her costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted Attorney’s motion to dismiss without requiring, as a condition of the dismissal, payment of Client’s attorney fees, holding that Nev. R. App. P. 42(b) does not authorize the routine imposition of attorney fees on a party who seeks to voluntarily dismiss a nonfrivolous writ petition after an answer has been filed. View "Breeden v. District Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon and other related crimes. At trial, the jury was engaged in deliberations when the district court dismissed a juror and replaced that juror with an alternate juror. The court did not recall the jury to the courtroom or instruct it to restart deliberations. The reconstituted jury deliberated for several hours before convicting Defendant. A panel of the Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s failure to instruct the jury to restart deliberations when the alternate juror replaced the original juror was of constitutional dimension; (2) the error was subject to plain error review because Defendant did not preserve the issue; and (3) Defendant failed to demonstrate that the district court’s failure to instruct the reconstituted jury to restart deliberations rose to the level of plain error. View "Martinorellan v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted for violations of Nevada’s so-called bad check statute (“the statute”) when 14 casino markers totaling $384,000 payable to four Las Vegas casinos were returned for insufficient funds. On appeal, Appellant argued that (1) the district court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that a casino’s knowledge of insufficient funds negates the intent-to-defraud element under the statute or, alternatively, constitutes an affirmative defense; and (2) the statute violates the Nevada Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the casinos had no present knowledge of Appellant’s insufficiency of funds at the time the markers were executed, there was no evidence to negate the intent-to-defraud element, and therefore, the district court did not err by refusing the instruction; (2) Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on an affirmative defense; and (3) the statute is constitutional. View "Zahavi v. State" on Justia Law

The Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC) convicted Appellant, an NNCC correctional officer, of providing legal services for a fee (an “MJ29” violation). Appellant challenged the MJ29 discipline through an informal grievance followed by a first-level formal grievance. After Appellant was informed by NNCC’s associate warden that he had exhausted the grievance process on this issue, Appellant filed a complaint in district court arguing that NNCC, among other things, improperly filed the MJ29 disciplinary charge and violated his due process rights by refusing to hear his grievance appeals. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust the grievance process and that Appellant had no liberty interest in a disciplinary appeals process. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; but (2) correctly determined that Appellant failed to state a due process claim. View "Abarra v. State" on Justia Law

The Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners filed an administrative complaint against Appellant, a physician, alleging that Appellant aided a third party in the unauthorized practice of medicine. When Appellant failed to comply with a Board-issued subpoena, the Board petitioned the Second Judicial District Court, located in Washoe County, for an order compelling compliance with its administrative subpoena. Appellant filed a motion to change the venue of the subpoena contempt petition to the Eighth Judicial District Court, located in Clark County, on the basis that she resided and practiced medicine in Clark County. The district court denied Appellant’s motion for a change of venue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the statute governing venue for contempt petitions brought by the Board providing that venue is proper in “the district court of the county in which the proceeding is being conducted” means that venue lies in the county where the work of the Board takes place rather than the county where the conduct being investigated occurred. View "Jones v. State, Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

The underlying lawsuit sought redress for complications that arose in connection with a real-estate development project in Texas. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant, a Texas-based law firm that was solicited by a Nevada client to represent the client on an out-of-state matter. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that its contacts with Nevada were insufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that Defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction because it agreed to represent the Nevada-based client. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant then filed this original petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court (1) granted the petition insofar as it sought to vacate the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that Defendant was subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction; but (2) denied the petition to the extent that it sought to direct the district court to grant their motion to dismiss because additional evidence may have been procured while this writ petition was pending that may support a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. View "Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The City of North Las Vegas publicly announced its intent to condemn a portion of Appellant’s land but delayed condemning the property. Appellant sold the property before it was condemned. Appellant filed a complaint against the City for inverse condemnation and precondemnation proceedings. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In Buzz Stew I, the Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Appellant’s precondemnation damages claim, concluding that questions of fact remained regarding whether the City’s actions were unreasoanble and injurious; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the inverse condemnation claim because Appellant had not stated a takings claim upon which relief could be granted. On remand, the jury returned a verdict for the City, finding that the City’s delay was not unreasonable. On appeal, Appellant contended that newly discovered evidence presented at trial demonstrated that a taking of its property occurred and that a new trial was required due to errors made with regard to the precondemnation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial did not establish that a taking occurred while Appellant maintained an interest in the property; and (2) no error made below warranted a new trial. View "Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas" on Justia Law