Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners filed an administrative complaint against Appellant, a physician, alleging that Appellant aided a third party in the unauthorized practice of medicine. When Appellant failed to comply with a Board-issued subpoena, the Board petitioned the Second Judicial District Court, located in Washoe County, for an order compelling compliance with its administrative subpoena. Appellant filed a motion to change the venue of the subpoena contempt petition to the Eighth Judicial District Court, located in Clark County, on the basis that she resided and practiced medicine in Clark County. The district court denied Appellant’s motion for a change of venue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the statute governing venue for contempt petitions brought by the Board providing that venue is proper in “the district court of the county in which the proceeding is being conducted” means that venue lies in the county where the work of the Board takes place rather than the county where the conduct being investigated occurred. View "Jones v. State, Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

The underlying lawsuit sought redress for complications that arose in connection with a real-estate development project in Texas. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant, a Texas-based law firm that was solicited by a Nevada client to represent the client on an out-of-state matter. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that its contacts with Nevada were insufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that Defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction because it agreed to represent the Nevada-based client. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant then filed this original petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court (1) granted the petition insofar as it sought to vacate the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that Defendant was subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction; but (2) denied the petition to the extent that it sought to direct the district court to grant their motion to dismiss because additional evidence may have been procured while this writ petition was pending that may support a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. View "Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The City of North Las Vegas publicly announced its intent to condemn a portion of Appellant’s land but delayed condemning the property. Appellant sold the property before it was condemned. Appellant filed a complaint against the City for inverse condemnation and precondemnation proceedings. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In Buzz Stew I, the Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Appellant’s precondemnation damages claim, concluding that questions of fact remained regarding whether the City’s actions were unreasoanble and injurious; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the inverse condemnation claim because Appellant had not stated a takings claim upon which relief could be granted. On remand, the jury returned a verdict for the City, finding that the City’s delay was not unreasonable. On appeal, Appellant contended that newly discovered evidence presented at trial demonstrated that a taking of its property occurred and that a new trial was required due to errors made with regard to the precondemnation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial did not establish that a taking occurred while Appellant maintained an interest in the property; and (2) no error made below warranted a new trial. View "Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm, receiving or possessing stolen goods, and carrying a concealed weapon. Defendant moved to suppress the handgun evidence and to dismiss the charges, arguing that his detention after a law enforcement officer confirmed that he was not in violation of curfew was unconstitutional and, therefore, the encounter evolved into an illegal seizure that resulted in the discovery of the firearm. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer’s continued detention of Defendant, after he dispelled any suspicion that Defendant was committing a crime, constituted an illegal seizure and should have been suppressed because no intervening circumstance purged the taint of the illegal seizure. View "Torres v. State" on Justia Law

Patients of certain healthcare facilities were advised to testify for blood-borne diseases after it was discovered that those healthcare facilities used unsafe injection practices during certain procedures. Plaintiffs, patients of those facilities who had undergone such procedures, filed a complaint on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of similarly situated individuals against PacifiCare of Nevada, Inc., a health maintenance organization, asserting negligence on the ground that PacifiCare failed to establish and implement a quality assurance program to oversee the medical providers within its network. The district court granted PacifiCare’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a negligence claim because they had not alleged an “actual injury,” such as testing positive for a blood-borne illness. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs’ complaint adequately alleged an injury in the form of exposure to unsafe injection practices that caused a need for ongoing medical monitoring to detect latent diseases that may result from those unsafe practices. View "Sadler v. PacifiCare of Nev., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate at Lovelock Correctional Center, filed a petition seeking mandamus and injunctive relief to compel Respondent, Nevada’s Chief Medical Officer, to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.382(1)(b) by examining the nutritional adequacy of inmate diets and making the required semiannual reports to the Board of State Prison Commissioners regarding her findings. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent failed to fulfill the duties imposed on her by section 209.382(1)(b). Remanded to the district court with instructions to issue a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent to comply with the requirements of section 209.382(1)(b) in accordance with this opinion. View "Stockmeier v. Green" on Justia Law

In May 2014, the City of Reno decided to lay off thirty-two firefighters. The City stated that its decision was based on a lack of funds. A collective bargaining agreement between the City and the International Association of Firefighters, Local 731 (union) provides that the right to lay off employees due to lack of funds is reserved to the City without negotiation. The union and the firefighters who would be laid off (collectively, IAFF) filed a complaint in the district court, claiming that the City had the funds to continue the firefighters’ employment. The IAFF also filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The City filed a motion to dismiss due to the IAFF’s failure to exhaust contractual and administrative remedies. The district court proceeded to enjoin the City from proceeding with the layoffs while the IAFF exhausted its contractual grievance and administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the underlying grievance was not arbitrable under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, and therefore, the district court lacked authority to rule on the request for injunctive relief. View "City of Reno v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 731" on Justia Law

Electrical problems at a plastic bag manufacturing plant led to an increased number of defective bags being produced. A dispute arose between the manufacturer and its insurer regarding what provision of the policy covered the losses associated with the defective bags and regarding what policy limit should apply to the manufacturer’s property loss. The district court submitted both issues to the jury. The jury awarded the manufacturer damages for breach of the insurance contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in sending the two questions to the jury because (1) categorizing the insured’s loss under the policy is a question of law and not a question of fact, and (2) determining which policy limit applies presents a question of law. Remanded. View "Fed. Ins. Co. v. Coast Converters, Inc." on Justia Law

Gordon and Carol Lane took out a loan secured by a piece of commercial real estate. John Serpa executed a personal guaranty upon the loan. The Lanes defaulted on their obligation, and Serpa failed to fulfill his guarantor duties. Before the original lender exercised its right to foreclose, the FDIC was appointed its receiver and assigned the interest in the Lanes’ loan to First Financial Bank, N.A. (FFB). FFB foreclosed and sold the property to itself. FFB then brought a deficiency judgment and breach of guaranty action against the Lanes and Serpa (collectively, Respondents). The district court entered judgment in Respondents’ favor under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.451 because the fair market value of the property exceeded the consideration the FFB paid the FDIC to acquire a lien on the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of “indebtedness” found in section 40.451 does not limit the amount a successor lienholder can recover in an action for a deficiency judgment to the amount of consideration such a lienholder paid to obtain its interest in the note and deed of trust. Remanded. View "First Fin. Bank v. Lane" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. Defendant’s theory of defense was that another man, Robert Belsey, killed the victim. In furtherance of his theories, Defendant designated an expert to testify on police interrogation techniques to establish that Defendant falsely incriminated himself. Defendant also sought to introduce evidence of two incidents of domestic violence in which Belsey had previously been involved. The district court excluded the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed with the exception of a correction ordered with respect to the appropriate restitution, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence; and (2) two unobjected-to comments by the district judge that Defendant asserted improperly vouched for a police officer’s credibility and disparaged the defense did not amount to plain error. View "Brant v. State" on Justia Law