Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Check City filed a complaint for declaratory relief seeking clarification of Nev. Rev. Stat. 604A.425, which limits the amount of a deferred deposit loan to twenty-five-percent of a borrower’s expected gross monthly income. At issue was whether the twenty-five-percent cap includes only the principal borrowed or the principal amount plus any interest or fees charged. The district court granted Check City’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the cap only applied to the principal borrowed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 604A.425’s twenty-five-percent cap on deferred deposit loans includes both the principal amount loaned and any interest or fees charged; (2) section 604A.050 defines the phrase “deferred deposit loan” to include principal, interest, and fees; and (3) neither statute is ambiguous. View "State, Dep’t of Bus. & Indus. v. Check City P’ship, LLC" on Justia Law

The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) filed a petition for protective custody of C.B. and A.L., two minor children, alleging that Mother had either physically abused or negligently supervised C.B., whose face had been burned. The hearing master recommended sustaining the abuse and neglect petition on the ground that Mother had physically abused C.B. The juvenile court affirmed the hearing master’s recommendation, concluding that the injury was not accidental. After a trial, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to the two children. The court relied on the hearing master’s findings, as affirmed by the juvenile court, that Mother was at fault for C.B.’s injuries and that the injuries were nonaccidental. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) DFS conceded error on the issue of the district court’s reliance on the juvenile court’s determination that C.B.’s injury was caused by Mother; and (2) since the finding of intentional abuse was based on a concededly improper failure to admit evidence rebutting a statutory presumption, a new trial was required to determine Mother’s parental rights. View "In re Parental Rights as to A.L." on Justia Law

Appellant filed an unpaid wage action against four defendants, including Video Internet Phone Installs, Inc. (VIPI). The claims against VIPI were severed from the rest of the claims and thereafter resolved. Appellant did not appeal from the order resolving the claims against VIPI but, rather, appealed from the order finally resolving the remaining unsevered claims before challenging two interlocutory orders involving VIPI. VIPI filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as to it. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding (1) one must take an appeal from an order finally resolving severed claims, even if the unsevered claims remain pending; and (2) because Appellant failed to timely appeal from the order resolving the severed claims against VIPI, he could not now challenge the orders regarding VIPI in an appeal from the order finally resolving the unsevered claims. View "Valdez v. Cox Commc’ns" on Justia Law

Appellants, performers at Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club, challenged Sapphire’s practice of paying no wages to the performers, claiming they were “employees” within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.010 and thus entitled to minimum wage. The district court granted summary judgment for Sapphire, concluding that the performers were not “employees” within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed after adopting the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “economic realities” test for employment in the minimum wage context, holding that, based on a review of the totality of the circumstances of the working relationship’s economic reality in this case, Sapphire qualifies as an employer under Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.011 and the performers qualify as employees under section 608.010. Remanded. View "Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) extender statute, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(14)(A), which governs the timeliness of the deficiency judgment suits that are brought by the FDIC, preempts Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1)’s six-month time limitation for deficiency judgment actions. In this case, FDIC filed a claim for a deficiency judgment after section 40.455(1)’s six-month deadline but within the FDIC extender statute’s six-year time limitation. The district court dismissed the deficiency judgment claim as untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the FDIC extender statute expressly preempts section 40.455(1) regardless of whether the state statute is a statute of limitations or repose; and (2) because the FDIC filed its deficiency judgment action within the FDIC extender statute’s time limitation, the district court erred in dismissing the FDIC’s deficiency judgment action as time-barred. View "Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp. v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for fraud and deceptive trade practices in connection with a real estate purchase and loan arrangement. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him compensatory damages consisting of actual damages and emotional distress damages, as well as punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to consequential damages and remanded for a redetermination of punitive damages. On remand, the district court instructed the jury that it was to decide “what amount, if any, [Plaintiff] was entitled to for punitive damages.” After punitive damages were awarded, Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s punitive damages award and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.005(3) requires a second jury on remand to reassess whether punitive damages are warranted before that jury may determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded; and (2) because the jury instruction did not require the jury to make the threshold determination of whether punitive damages could be awarded, the case must be remanded for a new trial on punitive damages. View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Betsinger" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped for speeding and admitted to having smoked marijuana five hours before the stop. Law enforcement officers informed Defendant that they would perform a blood draw, during which Defendant struggled by striking two officers. The blood draw showed that Defendant had THC in his blood. Defendant was charged with unlawful use or being under the influence of a controlled substance, among other offenses. Defendant was convicted of all counts. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the natural dissipation of marijuana in the blood stream does not constitute a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search; (2) Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.160(7), which permits officers to use force to obtain a blood sample from a person, is unconstitutional, and the blood draw in this case was unlawful because Defendant did not submit to it; but (3) because the blood draw was taken in good faith, the exclusionary rule did not apply, and the Fourth Amendment violation therefore did not warrant reversal of the judgment of conviction. View "Byars v. State" on Justia Law

These consolidated writ petitions arose from a construction-defect action initiated by The Regent at Town Centre Homeowners’ Association against Oxbow Construction, LLC. Oxbow served as the general contractor of the Regent at Town Centre mixed-use community (Town Centre). The Association, on behalf of itself and the condominium unit-owners, served Oxbow with Nev. Rev. Stat. 40 notice, alleging construction defects in the common elements of the condominiums. The district court ultimately allowed claims seeking Chapter 40 remedies to proceed for alleged construction defects in limited common elements assigned to multiple units containing at least one “new residence.” Both parties filed writ petitions challenging the district court’s rulings. The Supreme Court denied both petitions, holding that the district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by (1) failing to perform a Nev. R. Civ. P. 23 class-action analysis; (2) determining that previously occupied units in Town Centre did not qualify for Chapter 40 remedies; and (3) concluding that the Association could pursue Chapter 40 remedies for construction defects in the common elements of buildings containing at least one previously unoccupied unit, i.e., a “new residence.” View "Oxbow Constr., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of battery with a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion for an order mandating the prosecutor to provide a summary of any jury panel information gathered and developed by the prosecution that was inaccessible to the defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant established neither a constitutional nor statutory basis for the Court to reverse his conviction based on the district court’s denial of his motion to compel disclosure of prosecution-gathered juror background information. View "Artiga-Morales v. State" on Justia Law

The Copper Sands Homeowners Association (the HOA) brought an action against the developer and general contractor (collectively, the Developers) of the Copper Sands common-interest community, alleging several claims for various construction defects. The Developers impleaded subcontractors who had performed work on the project into the action as third-party defendants. Eventually, the district court dismissed the HOA’s claims against the Developers, awarded the Developers attorney fees and costs, and awarded the third-party defendants costs against the HOA. The HOA appealed, arguing that the district court did not have the authority to award the third-party defendants costs. The Supreme Court reversed the costs award to the third-party defendants, holding that when a third-party defendant prevails in an action and moves for costs pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.020, which mandates an award of costs for the prevailing party in a case, the district court must determine which party - plaintiff or defendant - is adverse to the third-party defendant and allocate the costs award accordingly. Remanded. View "Copper Sands Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Flamingo 94, LLC" on Justia Law