Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was employed by Employer at a store located on property owned by Casino (Employer and Casino henceforth referred to as “Casino”). Appellant was engaged to Fiancé when Fiancé filed a complaint with the Nevada Gaming Control Board (NGCB) regarding some of Casino’s slot machines. Casino subsequently terminated Appellant’s employment. Appellant filed suit against Casino alleging that Casino terminated her employment in retaliation for Fiancé’s complaint to the NGCB. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim because Nevada has not recognized a cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge. The Supreme Court affirmed, thus declining to recognize a common law cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge, holding that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Brown v. Eddie World, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, then a teacher for the Washoe County School District (WCSD), pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana in his residence. Before Appellant completed his probation, the WCSD terminated his employment for immorality and conviction of a felony or of a crime involving moral turpitude. Appellant sought unemployment benefits. The Employment Security Division (ESD) denied benefits, finding that Appellant’s guilty plea established that the WCSD had terminated him for “workplace misconduct.” Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.3363, certain first-time drug offenders may avoid a criminal conviction if the offender pleads guilty and then successfully completes a probationary period, after which time the charges are dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that unemployment benefits for workplace misconduct were erroneously denied where the WCSD relied on a felony conviction that didn’t exist to establish that Appellant committed disqualifying misconduct for which he was terminated. View "Hohenstein v. State, Employment Sec. Div." on Justia Law

Coyote Springs Investment, LLC and BrightSource Energy, Inc. entered into a lease. One year later, BrightSource sought to terminate the lease. Coyote Springs sued BrightSource, claiming that the lease’s termination was ineffective without payment of the termination fee. Before trial, the parties deposed Harvey Whittemore, the former co-owner and manager of Coyote Springs. During the deposition, Coyote Springs requested a recess in order to conduct a private conference with Whittemore. The trial commenced, and during cross-examination of Whittemore, BrightSource’s counsel inquired as to what was discussed at the deposition conference. Coyote Springs objected based on attorney-client privilege. The trial court overruled the objection, determining that the communication was not privileged. Coyote Springs petitioned for extraordinary writ relief on the deposition issue. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the communications between Whittemore and counsel for Coyote Springs during the break in Whittemore’s deposition were discoverable because Coyote Springs requested the recess in the deposition and failed to make a sufficient, contemporaneous record of the conference so as to preserve the attorney-client privilege. View "Coyote Springs Inv., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. In the first case, Defendant received the maximum possible sentence. In the second case, Defendant again received the maximum possible sentence. The district court ordered that the second sentence be served consecutively to the sentence previously imposed in the first case. At issue on appeal was Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.035(1), which expressly permits a district court to order that a sentence for a first felony offense when a defendant has already been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for another felony offense, be imposed either concurrently or consecutively to the first sentence. Defendant asserted that section 176.035(1) was unconstitutional because it affords “virtually unfettered discretion” to the district court to determine whether sentences for separate offenses should be imposed concurrently or consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that section 176.035(1) is not unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the federal and state Constitutions, as the statute is comprehensible to persons of ordinary intelligence. View "Pitmon v. State" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were two mining companies. Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court alleging that Defendant owed it royalty payments under an area-of-interest provision in a 1979 commercial mining agreement. Defendant argued that it did not owe royalties because the area-of-interest provision was void under the rule against perpetuities. Plaintiff countered that the rule does not apply to area-of-interest royalty agreements. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant based on the rule against perpetuities. Plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Court answered that Nevada’s common-law rule against perpetuities does not extend to area-of-interest royalties created by commercial mining agreements. View "Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc." on Justia Law

In this child custody case, the parties entered into an agreement for joint custody at the time of their divorce. Seven years later, Mother requested that the district court modify the child custody designation to provide her with primary physical custody, in accordance with Rivero v. Rivero. Specifically, Mother argued that she was entitled to be the child’s primary physical guardian because Father did not have the child at least forty percent of the time under the agreed custodial arrangement. After a hearing, the district court granted the request. The court’s order, however, did not state whether this modification was in the child’s best interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a district court has authority to review and modify the parties’ timeshare arrangement once a modification request is made by either party; (2) the child’s best interest must be the primary consideration for modifying custody, and Rivero’s forty-percent guideline shall serve as a tool in determining what custody arrangement is in the child’s best interest; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider the child’s best interest when modifying custody. View "Bluestein v. Bluestein" on Justia Law

Robert Krause retained Woods & Erickson, LLP for estate planning services. Woods & Erickson created for Krause an asset protection trust, into which Krause transferred his assets. The Cadle Company, which was attempting to collect on a judgment against Krause, filed a second amended complaint against Woods & Erickson, asserting claims for conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and concert of action. Specifically, the Cadle Company alleged that that Krause had fraudulently transferred the assets and that Woods & Erickson had unlawfully facilitated the fraudulent transfers. The district court entered judgment in favor of Woods & Erickson on all claims and awarded Woods & Erickson attorney fees. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s judgment on the merits, holding that Nevada law does not recognize accessory liability for fraudulent transfers; and (2) reversed the portion of the court’s order awarding photocopy costs, runner service costs, and certain deposition transcription costs, holding that the court erred by awarding these costs because no evidence was presented showing that those costs were reasonable, necessary, and actually incurred. View "Cadle Co. v. Woods & Erickson, LLP" on Justia Law

When Respondent was born, her birth certificate identified Decedent as her father. Decedent later married Respondent’s mother but never formally established or challenged his status as Respondent’s father. When Decedent died, Appellants, Decedent’s sister and nephew, filed an ex parte petition for appointment as special administrators of Decedent’s estate. The petition identified Decedent’s siblings and their issue as his heirs, and Respondent was identified as Decedent’s stepdaughter. The district court made Appellants co-administrators of the estate. Respondent then filed a petition for revocation of the letters of special administration and for appointment as the special administrator, arguing that, as Decedent’s child, she had priority in appointment. The probate commissioner suggested that the district court find Respondent was Decedent’s child and entitled to appointment as administrator. The district court ordered that the report and recommendation be fully accepted and adopted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) paternity contests in intestacy proceedings are governed by the Nevada Parentage Act; and (2) Appellants were time-barred by, and lacked standing under, the Nevada Parentage Act to challenge Respondent’s presumptive paternity. View "In re Estate of Murray" on Justia Law

Borrower took out a loan from the predecessor-in-interest of Bank. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on certain property and personally guaranteed by Guarantor. After Borrower defaulted and Guarantor failed to fulfill his obligations, Bank instituted an action seeking a receiver to collect rents from and to sell the secured property. The district court approved the request. The receiver (Receiver) subsequently entered into a purchase and sale agreement with a third-party purchaser (Purchaser). The district court approved the sale, and Purchaser paid the agreed-upon price and obtained the deed to the property. Bank then filed a complaint seeking to recover the amount of Guarantor’s indebtedness that the net proceeds that the sale did not satisfy. Borrower and Guarantor (together, Respondents) moved for summary judgment, arguing that the relief sought was in essence an application for a deficiency judgment under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1), which Bank was precluded from seeking because Bank failed to comply with section 40.455(1)’s time frame. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 40.455(1) applied in this case; and (2) Bank’s application for a deficiency judgment was timely. Remanded. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Palmilla Dev. Co." on Justia Law

CenturyLink, a private telecommunications provider, contracted with Clark County to provide inmate telephone services for the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) and to make records of the inmates’ calls available to the governmental agency operating the jail. Blackjack Bonding, Inc. made a public records request to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), the governmental entity that runs the CCDC, seeking records regarding calls to all telephone numbers listed on the various bond agent jail lists posted in CCDC for certain years. LVMPD denied the request. Blackjack then sought mandamus relief to compel LVMPD to provide the requested records. The district court (1) granted in part Blackjack’s request, stating that the requested records were public records that LVMPD had a duty to produce; and (2) denied Blackjack’s motion for attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting in part Blackjack’s petition for a writ of mandamus, as the requested information was a public record subject to LVMPD’s legal custody or control; and (2) abused its discretion by refusing to award reasonable attorney fees and costs to Blackjack. View "LVMPD v. Blackjack Bonding" on Justia Law