Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A stock transfer agent gave a stockholder an allegedly incomplete and misleading answer to a question about its requirements for removing a restrictive legend on the stockholder’s stock. The stockholder sued the transfer agent, asserting claims for violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.8401 and 104.8407, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy. Under sections 104.8401 and 104.8407, a transfer agent must, on proper request, register a transfer of securities without unreasonable delay. The district court granted the transfer agent’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sections 104.8401 and 104.8407 did not support liability in this case because the stockholder did not ask the transfer agent to remove the legend and reissue him clean shares, and because the stockholder never submitted a transfer request, the agent’s statutory duty to register a requested transfer did not arise; and (2) the stockholder’s common law claims failed on the grounds that they were not supported by competent evidence. View "Guilfoyle v. Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer" on Justia Law

When Husband and Wife divorced, the district court entered a divorce decree allocating Wife a community property interest in Husband’s Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) pension plan. The district court later entered a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) giving Wife a survivor beneficiary interest in Husband’s PERS pension. Husband filed a motion to modify the QDRO, arguing the QDRO did not effectuate the division in the divorce decree. Wife moved for a judgment awarding her the community property pension payments she could have received since the time Husband became eligible to retire. The district court granted Husband’s motion to modify the QDRO and denied Wife’s motion for judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) unless specifically set forth in the divorce decree, an allocation of a community property interest in the employee spouse’s pension plan does not also entitle the nonemployee spouse to survivor benefits; and (2) the nonemployee spouse must first file a motion requesting immediate receipt of his or her portion of the community property interest in the employee spouse’s pension benefits. View "Henson v. Henson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary, robbery, and abuse or neglect of an older person. After the jury venire entered the courtroom for voir dire, Defendant’s counsel sought to strike the venire on the grounds that it contained no Black prospective jurors and thus did not reach a fair cross section of the community. After granting an evidentiary hearing but before holding it, the district judge sua sponte denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the jury-selection process did not systematically exclude Black citizens. The jury panel was subsequently selected and sworn in and Defendant was found guilty of burglary and robbery. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, holding that it is structural error for a district court to deny a motion to strike a jury venire after granting an evidentiary hearing but before completing the hearing. Remanded for a new trial. View "Buchanan v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant leased commercial real property from Respondent. Appellant vacated the property and ceased paying rent after a significant water intrusion event. Respondent filed a complaint alleging that Appellant breached the lease. Appellant counterclaimed that Respondent constructively evicted Appellant by failing to maintain the roof. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding (1) severe water intrusion justified Appellant’s vacating the property; but (2) the lease obligated Appellant to provide Respondent written notice of and thirty days to cure the water intrusion before exercising any other potential remedies, and Appellant did comply with the notice and cure provision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s factual findings did not support Appellant’s argument that it was constructively evicted, and therefore, the Court did not need to address whether Appellant was required to comply with the lease’s notice and cure provision in order to successfully assert constructive eviction. View "Mason-McDuffie Real Estate, Inc. v. Villa Fiore Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

Real party in interest Michael Wiley brought a putative class action against Renown Regional Medical Center regarding its lien practices. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court denied Renown’s motion and granted Wiley’s motion. Notably, the court found in favor of Wiley on two of his claims for relief even though the full merits of those claims were not specifically argued in the cross-motions for summary judgment or at the hearing. Renown then filed this original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s order. The Supreme Court (1) granted the petition in part, holding that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on the two causes of action that were not argued in summary judgment briefing or in oral argument; and (2) denied the remainder of the petition. View "Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree kidnapping and first-degree murder of his wife. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the State’s use of six of its nine peremptory challenges to remove female veniremembers did not give rise to an inference of gender discrimination, and the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to exclude an African-American veniremember did not violate Batson v. Kentucky; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to represent himself; (4) the district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury regarding the definition of mitigation; and (5) the remainder of Appellant’s allegations of error were without merit. View "Watson v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit in federal court seeking a declaration that Nevada’s Live Entertainment Tax (NLET) was facially unconstitutional for violating the First Amendment. The federal court dismissed the suit. Appellants then filed a de novo action (Case 1) in a Nevada district court seeking similar remedies to those sought in federal court and asserting an as-applied challenge to NLET. While Case 1 was pending, Appellants filed individual tax refund requests with the Nevada Department of Taxation on the grounds that NLET is facially unconstitutional. The Department denied refunds, and the Nevada Tax Commission affirmed. Appellants then filed a second de novo action (Case 2) challenging the administrative denials of their refund requests and asserting an as-applied challenge to NLET. The district court (1) dismissed Appellants’ as-applied challenge in Case 1; and (2) dismissed the entirety of Case 2 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants failed to file a petition for judicial review after the completion of their administrative proceedings. This appeal challenging the district court’s dismissal of Case 2 followed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Nevada law required Appellants to file a petition for judicial review. View "Deja Vu Showgirls of Las Vegas, LLC v. Nev. Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Nevada Legislature enacted the Live Entertainment Tax (NLET), which imposes an excise tax on business transactions completed at facilities providing live entertainment. Appellants, exotic dancing establishments, filed suit arguing that NLET was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The district court ultimately (1) dismissed the as-applied challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Appellants’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (2) concluded that NLET did not facially violate the first Amendment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ as-applied challenge because Appellants failed to raise their as-applied challenge to NLET before the Nevada Department of Taxation; and (2) concluded that NLET does not violate the First Amendment as related to speech (i.e., dance), and therefore affirmed the district court’s summary judgment as to this issue. View "Deja Vu Showgirls of Las Vegas, LLC v. Nev. Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

Gilbert Hyatt, an inventor, sued the Franchise Tax Board of the State of California (FTB) in 1998 seeking damages for intentional torts and bad faith conduct allegedly committed by FTB auditors during tax audits of the inventor’s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns. Eventually, Hyatt’s case went to a jury, which found in favor of Hyatt on all intentional tort causes of action. The jury awarded $139 million in compensatory damages and $250 million in punitive damages. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Court’s exception for government immunity for intentional and bad faith conduct survives the adoption of the federal discretionary function immunity test; (2) all of Hyatt’s causes of action, except for his fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims, failed as a matter of law; (3) in regard to Hyatt’s fraud and IIED claims, substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings as to liability, but errors committed by the court required reversal of the damages awarded for IIED; (4) FTB was not entitled to a statutory cap on the amount of damages Hyatt may recover on the fraud and IIED claims under comity; and (5) under comity principles, FTB is immune from punitive damages. View "Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Hyatt" on Justia Law

A common interest community subject to covenants, conditions, and restrictions was encumbered by a note and deed of trust in favor of U.S. Bank, N.A. The former homeowners fell delinquent on their association dues and defaulted on their obligations to U.S. Bank. The community homeowners’ association (SHHOA) and U.S. Bank separately initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC purchased the property at the SHHOA’s trustee's sale and filed an action to quiet title and enjoin the trustee’s sale on U.S. Bank’s deed of trust, alleging that the SHHOA trustee’s deed extinguished U.S. Bank’s deed of trust. The district court granted judgment for U.S. Bank, holding that a homeowners’ association (HOA) must proceed judicially to validly foreclose its superpriority lien, and since the SHHOA foreclosed nonjudicially, U.S. Bank’s first deed of trust survived the SHHOA trustee’s sale and was senior to the trustee’s deed received by SFR. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2) gives an HOA a true superpriority lien, proper foreclosure of which will extinguish a first deed of trust; and (2) chapter 116 permits nonjudicial foreclosure of HOA liens. View "SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law