Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Elsinore, LLC purchased a property located within the Peccole Ranch planned community that was subject to a lien for unpaid community-association assessments. Elsinore paid the outstanding association dues and then sold the property. Thereafter, Elsionre filed a complaint against Peccole Ranch with the Nevada Real Estate Division (NRED) on behalf of itself and a class of property owners. Peccole Ranch then filed a district court action against Elsinore. Elsinore counterclaimed for declaratory relief and damages on bhealf of itself and the identified class. Peccole Ranch filed a third-party complaint against Nevada Association Services (NAS), one of its agents, seeking indemnification and contribution for any damages that Elsinore and the class recovered from Peccole Ranch. NAS and Peccole Ranch moved for summary judgment against Elsinore's counterclaims for damages on the basis that the voluntary payment doctrine barred Elsinore’s and the class members’ claims. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding that the voluntary payment doctrine was a complete defense to Elsinore’s claims, and therefore, the district court erred by denying NAS and Peccole Ranch’s motion for summary judgment. View "Nev. Ass'n Servs. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

The purchasers of condominiums at a Las Vegas resort filed suit against approximately forty defendants, including JDI Loans, LLC and JDI Realty, LLC (collectively, the JDI entities), alleging that the resort’s marketing material represented that it was in a partnership with the JDI entities, that several defendants engaged in actionable wrongdoings, and that the JDI entities were liable for these actionable wrongdoings under Nev. Rev. Stat. 87.160(1), which codifies the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment for the JDI entities as to their liability under section 87.160(1), concluding that a “reference to a ‘strategic partner’” in the marketing materials was insufficient to establish partnership by estoppel. The Supreme Court reversed after clarifying the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment to the JDI entities with regard to their liability under Nev. Rev. Stat. 87.160(1). View "In re Cay Clubs" on Justia Law

NV Energy owns and operates electricity-generating plants in Nevada. NV Energy fueled two of those plants with coal obtained from mines outside Nevada and paid a use tax for its coal consumption pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 372.185. NV Energy petitioned the State Department of Taxation for a refund for the use taxes it paid on coal purchased over a four-year period, arguing that the Nev. Rev. Stat. 372.270 exemption from the use tax for locally produced mine and mineral proceeds discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court concluded that the exemption violated the Commerce Clause and struck the statute in its entirety but refused to award NV Energy any refund. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 372.270 is not severable; and (2) because NV Energy did not have any competitors who received the tax benefit, the tax scheme did not actually discriminate against interstate commerce, and therefore, NV Energy was not entitled to a refund. View "Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. State, Dep’t of Taxation" on Justia Law

Check City filed a complaint for declaratory relief seeking clarification of Nev. Rev. Stat. 604A.425, which limits the amount of a deferred deposit loan to twenty-five-percent of a borrower’s expected gross monthly income. At issue was whether the twenty-five-percent cap includes only the principal borrowed or the principal amount plus any interest or fees charged. The district court granted Check City’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the cap only applied to the principal borrowed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 604A.425’s twenty-five-percent cap on deferred deposit loans includes both the principal amount loaned and any interest or fees charged; (2) section 604A.050 defines the phrase “deferred deposit loan” to include principal, interest, and fees; and (3) neither statute is ambiguous. View "State, Dep’t of Bus. & Indus. v. Check City P’ship, LLC" on Justia Law

The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) filed a petition for protective custody of C.B. and A.L., two minor children, alleging that Mother had either physically abused or negligently supervised C.B., whose face had been burned. The hearing master recommended sustaining the abuse and neglect petition on the ground that Mother had physically abused C.B. The juvenile court affirmed the hearing master’s recommendation, concluding that the injury was not accidental. After a trial, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to the two children. The court relied on the hearing master’s findings, as affirmed by the juvenile court, that Mother was at fault for C.B.’s injuries and that the injuries were nonaccidental. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) DFS conceded error on the issue of the district court’s reliance on the juvenile court’s determination that C.B.’s injury was caused by Mother; and (2) since the finding of intentional abuse was based on a concededly improper failure to admit evidence rebutting a statutory presumption, a new trial was required to determine Mother’s parental rights. View "In re Parental Rights as to A.L." on Justia Law

Appellant filed an unpaid wage action against four defendants, including Video Internet Phone Installs, Inc. (VIPI). The claims against VIPI were severed from the rest of the claims and thereafter resolved. Appellant did not appeal from the order resolving the claims against VIPI but, rather, appealed from the order finally resolving the remaining unsevered claims before challenging two interlocutory orders involving VIPI. VIPI filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as to it. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding (1) one must take an appeal from an order finally resolving severed claims, even if the unsevered claims remain pending; and (2) because Appellant failed to timely appeal from the order resolving the severed claims against VIPI, he could not now challenge the orders regarding VIPI in an appeal from the order finally resolving the unsevered claims. View "Valdez v. Cox Commc’ns" on Justia Law

Appellants, performers at Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club, challenged Sapphire’s practice of paying no wages to the performers, claiming they were “employees” within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.010 and thus entitled to minimum wage. The district court granted summary judgment for Sapphire, concluding that the performers were not “employees” within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed after adopting the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “economic realities” test for employment in the minimum wage context, holding that, based on a review of the totality of the circumstances of the working relationship’s economic reality in this case, Sapphire qualifies as an employer under Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.011 and the performers qualify as employees under section 608.010. Remanded. View "Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) extender statute, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(14)(A), which governs the timeliness of the deficiency judgment suits that are brought by the FDIC, preempts Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1)’s six-month time limitation for deficiency judgment actions. In this case, FDIC filed a claim for a deficiency judgment after section 40.455(1)’s six-month deadline but within the FDIC extender statute’s six-year time limitation. The district court dismissed the deficiency judgment claim as untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the FDIC extender statute expressly preempts section 40.455(1) regardless of whether the state statute is a statute of limitations or repose; and (2) because the FDIC filed its deficiency judgment action within the FDIC extender statute’s time limitation, the district court erred in dismissing the FDIC’s deficiency judgment action as time-barred. View "Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp. v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for fraud and deceptive trade practices in connection with a real estate purchase and loan arrangement. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him compensatory damages consisting of actual damages and emotional distress damages, as well as punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to consequential damages and remanded for a redetermination of punitive damages. On remand, the district court instructed the jury that it was to decide “what amount, if any, [Plaintiff] was entitled to for punitive damages.” After punitive damages were awarded, Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s punitive damages award and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.005(3) requires a second jury on remand to reassess whether punitive damages are warranted before that jury may determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded; and (2) because the jury instruction did not require the jury to make the threshold determination of whether punitive damages could be awarded, the case must be remanded for a new trial on punitive damages. View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Betsinger" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped for speeding and admitted to having smoked marijuana five hours before the stop. Law enforcement officers informed Defendant that they would perform a blood draw, during which Defendant struggled by striking two officers. The blood draw showed that Defendant had THC in his blood. Defendant was charged with unlawful use or being under the influence of a controlled substance, among other offenses. Defendant was convicted of all counts. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the natural dissipation of marijuana in the blood stream does not constitute a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search; (2) Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.160(7), which permits officers to use force to obtain a blood sample from a person, is unconstitutional, and the blood draw in this case was unlawful because Defendant did not submit to it; but (3) because the blood draw was taken in good faith, the exclusionary rule did not apply, and the Fourth Amendment violation therefore did not warrant reversal of the judgment of conviction. View "Byars v. State" on Justia Law