Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gilbert Hyatt, an inventor, sued the Franchise Tax Board of the State of California (FTB) in 1998 seeking damages for intentional torts and bad faith conduct allegedly committed by FTB auditors during tax audits of the inventor’s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns. Eventually, Hyatt’s case went to a jury, which found in favor of Hyatt on all intentional tort causes of action. The jury awarded $139 million in compensatory damages and $250 million in punitive damages. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Court’s exception for government immunity for intentional and bad faith conduct survives the adoption of the federal discretionary function immunity test; (2) all of Hyatt’s causes of action, except for his fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims, failed as a matter of law; (3) in regard to Hyatt’s fraud and IIED claims, substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings as to liability, but errors committed by the court required reversal of the damages awarded for IIED; (4) FTB was not entitled to a statutory cap on the amount of damages Hyatt may recover on the fraud and IIED claims under comity; and (5) under comity principles, FTB is immune from punitive damages. View "Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Hyatt" on Justia Law

A common interest community subject to covenants, conditions, and restrictions was encumbered by a note and deed of trust in favor of U.S. Bank, N.A. The former homeowners fell delinquent on their association dues and defaulted on their obligations to U.S. Bank. The community homeowners’ association (SHHOA) and U.S. Bank separately initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC purchased the property at the SHHOA’s trustee's sale and filed an action to quiet title and enjoin the trustee’s sale on U.S. Bank’s deed of trust, alleging that the SHHOA trustee’s deed extinguished U.S. Bank’s deed of trust. The district court granted judgment for U.S. Bank, holding that a homeowners’ association (HOA) must proceed judicially to validly foreclose its superpriority lien, and since the SHHOA foreclosed nonjudicially, U.S. Bank’s first deed of trust survived the SHHOA trustee’s sale and was senior to the trustee’s deed received by SFR. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2) gives an HOA a true superpriority lien, proper foreclosure of which will extinguish a first deed of trust; and (2) chapter 116 permits nonjudicial foreclosure of HOA liens. View "SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The mother of sixteen-month-old Max Zohar (collectively, the Zohars), filed a medical malpractice complaint against multiple defendants, including a physician, a nurse, and several EmCare entities (collectively, Respondents), asserting claims of medical malpractice, professional negligence and vicarious liability after Max’s finger was amputated. The Zohars attached an expert affidavit specifying the allegedly negligent activities of several individuals, but the affidavit did not identify Respondents by name. The district court granted Respondents’ motions to dismiss, concluding that the expert affidavit was deficient because it did not specifically name Respondents as negligent parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court should read a medical malpractice complaint and affidavit of merit together when determining whether the affidavit meets the requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071; and (2) in this case, the expert affidavit, while it failed to specifically name allegedly negligent defendants, adequately supported the allegations of medical malpractice against Respondents and provided adequate notice to Respondents of the claims against them, and therefore the district court erred in finding that the expert affidavit was inadequate to support the Zohars’ allegations of medical malpractice against Respondents. View "Zohar v. Zbiegien" on Justia Law

After Appellant was arrested for child abuse his daughter was placed in the custody of Washoe County Social Services (Social Services). The family court ordered Appellant to pay child support to Social Services. After Appellant pleaded guilty to one felony count of child abuse, Social Services sought restitution. Appellant objected to the amount sought by Social Services on the grounds that the family court had already entered a cost-of-care order. The district court ordered Appellant to pay restitution to Social Services, concluding that the family court’s order, which was based on Appellant’s ability to pay, did not affect the jurisdiction of the district court as to its criminal restitution order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court has jurisdiction to impose restitution to the State for the cost of child care in child abuse cases where the family court has already imposed an obligation on the defendant for the costs of supporting the child, but the district court must offset the restitution amount by the amount of the support obligation imposed by the family court. View "Major v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent supplied steel for projects on six properties. Respondent was not fully paid for the steel delivered to the properties, and consequently, Respondent perfected mechanics’ liens on the six properties. Respondent then filed a complaint for foreclosure against each property. Thereafter, surety bonds were posted and recorded for four properties. Respondent then amended its complaint to dismiss its lien foreclosure claims against those four properties, replacing them with claims against the sureties and principles on the surety bonds. The district court concluded that Respondent established liens on the six properties. The district court ordered the sale of all six properties without demonstrating that each surety bond was insufficient to pay the sum due on its respective property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a materialman has a lien upon a property and any improvements thereon for which he supplied materials in the amount of the unpaid balance due for those materials; (2) in this case, Respondent established a materialman’s lien on each of the six properties for the unpaid balance due on the steel delivered; and (3) the district court erred by ordering the sale of all six properties. View "Simmons Self-Storage Partners v. Rib Roof, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant obtained a home loan from IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (IndyMac F.S.B.) secured by a promissory note and deed of trust. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) was the legal beneficiary of the deed of trust. Appellant’s loan was later sold to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. IndyMac F.S.B.’s and Deutsche Bank’s obligations were listed in a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA). In 2012, Appellant elected to participate in Nevada’s foreclosure medication program (FMP) with IndyMac Mortgage Services (IndyMac), Deutsche Bank’s loan servicer. The mediation concluded unsuccessfully. Appellant sought judicial review, arguing that IndyMac had failed to establish that Deutsche Bank owned his loan because the MERS assignment violated the PSA’s terms and was therefore void. The district court denied Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a loan assignment made in violation of a PSA is not void, but merely voidable; (2) because Appellant was neither a party to nor an intended beneficiary of the PSA, Appellant lacked standing to contest the assignment’s validity; and (3) although Respondents produced an assignment at the mediation that was executed after the PSA’s closing date, the assignment was nevertheless effective to transfer ownership of Appellant’s loan to Deutsche Bank. View "Wood v. Germann" on Justia Law

Steven Jacobs, the former chief executive officer of Sands China Ltd., filed a complaint against his former employer, alleging, among other things, breach of contract claims. Throughout discovery on the issue of whether Sands was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, Sands maintained that it could not disclose any documents containing personal information that are located in Macau due to restrictions within the Macau Personal Data Protection Act (MPDPA). The district court subsequently issued an order precluding Sands from raising the MPDPA as an objection or defense to disclosure of any documents. Thereafter, Jacobs moved for Nev. R. Civ. P. 37 sanctions, arguing that Sands had violated the district court’s order by redacting personal data contained in its Macau-related document production based on MPDPA restrictions. The Supreme Court denied Sands’s petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, holding (1) the mere presence of a foreign international privacy statute does not itself preclude Nevada district courts from ordering litigants to comply with Nevada discovery rules; and (2) in this case, the district court properly found that the existence of a foreign international privacy statute did not excuse Petitioners from complying with the district court’s discovery order. View "Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Steven C. Jacobs, the former chief executive officer of Sands China Ltd., filed a complaint against his former employer, alleging, among other things, that Sands breached his employment contract. At issue in this case was Jacobs’ possession of purportedly privileged documents in the form of e-mails and other communications that he gathered on the day he was terminated. The district court ordered Jacobs to turn over the copies of the documents to an independent vendor. The district court granted Jacobs’ motion for the return of the documents, concluding that Jacobs was among the “class of persons” legally entitled to view and use privileged documents that pertained to his tenure at Sands. Sands then filed this original petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding (1) a corporation’s current management is the sole holder of its attorney-client privilege, and thus, Nevada law does not allow for a judicially created class of persons exception to attorney-client privilege; and (2) the district court erred in ruling that Jacobs, based solely on his former executive position with Sands, was legally allowed to use the purportedly privileged documents over Sands’s claim of privilege. View "Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Daisy Monzo gifted a condominium that she owned to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of her daughter, Charron Monzo. Daisy subsequently signed another deed transferring the condo back into her own name. Charron filed a petition seeking an order requiring Daisy to transfer the condo back to the trust. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Daisy, concluding that Daisy’s execution of the deed transferring title to the condo into the trust was based on unilateral mistakes. Charron then filed this original writ petition challenging the district court’s partial summary judgment order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) a donor may obtain relief from an erroneous gift if she proves by clear and convincing evidence that her intent was mistaken and not in accord with the donative transfer; (2) remedies available to correct such mistakes depend on the nature of the unilateral mistake in question; and (3) because it was uncertain what Daisy’s donative intent was at the time of the donative transfer, genuine issues of fact remained as to whether unilateral mistakes affected Daisy’s execution of the deed transferring the condo into the trust, and therefore, partial summary judgment was improper. View "In re Irrevocable Trust Agreement of 1979" on Justia Law

The litigation privilege immunizes from civil liability communicative acts occurring in the course of judicial proceedings, even if those acts would otherwise be tortious. Nevada had long recognized this common law privilege but until this case had not yet determined whether it applies to preclude claims of legal malpractice or professional negligence based on communicative acts occurring in the course of judicial proceedings. The federal court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether Nevada law recognizes an exception to the common law litigation privilege for legal malpractice and professional negligence actions. The Court answered the district court’s question in the affirmative, concluding that, generally, an attorney cannot assert the litigation privilege as a defense to legal malpractice and professional negligence claims. View "Greenberg Traurig, LLP v. Frias Holding Co." on Justia Law