Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, a corporation and an individual, were initially represented by an attorney at a local firm in the defense of a lawsuit. Before trial was scheduled to commence, the attorney resigned his employment with the local firm. Concerned that new counsel was not sufficiently familiar with the company’s case to represent it, Petitioners retained two out-of-state attorneys who had previously handled similar cases for the company. Petitioners then filed a motion to associate the attorneys. Although the attorneys met all of Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 42’s requirements for admission to practice, the district court summarily denied the motion on grounds that granting the request would delay the imminent start of trial and because Petitioners failed to show that out-of-state counsel were better able to handle the case than their local counsel. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order denying the motion to associate pro hac vice counsel and to instead enter an order granting that motion, holding that the district court’s refusal to allow Petitioners to associate pro hac vice counsel who met all the requirements for admission was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion. View "Imperial Credit Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In the underlying tort action, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The district court entered judgment on the verdict, resolving all issues except for attorney fees and costs. The district court subsequently entered an order awarding Plaintiff attorney fees and costs, which Defendant did not appeal. Thereafter, the district court entered an “amended judgment” incorporating the attorney fees and costs into the original judgment. Defendant then appealed the amended judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the amended judgment was superfluous and could not be appealed because it did not in any way alter the legal rights and obligations set forth in either the original judgment or the order awarding attorney fees and costs. View "Campos-Garcia v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Landowners filed a complaint against the City of North Las Vegas for inverse condemnation and precondemnation damages. The district court awarded Landowners precondemnation damages and attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders with the exception of the prejudgment interest award, which the Court reversed, concluding that the district court erred in failing to calculate prejudgment interest from the date on which the resulting injury arose. The City sought rehearing of that order on the prejudgment issue and on issues concerning the statute of limitations and standing. Although rehearing was not warranted, the Court took the opportunity to clarify the relevant law, holding (1) the Court’s dispositional order properly concluded that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date of taking, which was the first date of compensable injury; (2) the City could not raise its statute of limitations argument for the first time on rehearing, and even if it could, that defense was inapplicable to the facts of this case; and (3) rehearing was not warranted to clarify whether the City can assert a standing defense on remand. View "City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada certified three questions of law to the Supreme Court regarding the mechanic’s lien priority law, specifically, the visible-commencement-of-construction aspect of the law, which states that a mechanic’s lien takes priority over other encumbrances on a property that are recorded after construction of a work of improvement visibly commences. The Supreme Court answered (1) the Court’s holding in J.E. Dunn Northwest, Inc. v. Corus Construction Venture, LLC does not preclude a trier of fact from finding that grading property for a work of improvement constitutes visible commencement of construction; (2) the contract dates and permit issuance dates are irrelevant to the visible-commencement-of-construction test, even in this case where dirt material was placed on a future project site before building permits were issued and the general contractor was hired; and (3) the Court declined to answer the third certified question because it asked the Court to make findings of fact that should be left to the bankruptcy court. View "Byrd Underground, LLC v. Angaur, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.207’s limitations period, which the Supreme Court has stated in the past does not commence for a malpractice action until the conclusion of the litigation in which the malpractice occured. Claimants filed suit against New Albertson’s, Inc. for damages. New Albertson’s hired Brady, Vorwerck, Ryder & Caspino (BVRC) for legal representation, and BVRC assigned attorney W. Dennis Richardson to the case. New Albertson’s eventually settled the case. Over two years after New Albertson’s settlement with the claimants, New Albertson’s filed an attorney malpractice action against BVRC and Richardson. The suit was removed to the federal district court, which concluded that New Albertson’s action against BVRC was timely. The federal district court then granted BVRC’s motion to certify the question to the Supreme Court of whether 1997 amendments to section 11.207(1) rendered the litigation malpractice tolling rule obsolete. The Supreme Court answered that the two-year statute of limitations in section 11.207, as revised by the Legislature in 1997, is tolled against a cause of action for attorney malpractice pending the outcome of the underlying lawsuit in which the malpractice allegedly occurred. View "Brady, Vorwerck, Ryder & Caspino v. New Albertson’s, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a timely post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied on the merits. Appellant later filed a second post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s petition was untimely and successive, but Appellant argued he had good cause to excuse the procedural bars because his first post-conviction counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to present these claims in his first post-conviction petition. At issue in this case was whether, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may constitute good cause under Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726(1) and Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810 to allow a noncapital petitioner to file an untimely and successive post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Martinez does not alter the Court’s prior decisions that a petitioner has no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel and that post-conviction counsel’s performance does not constitute good cause to excuse the statutory procedural bars unless the appointment of that counsel was mandated by statute. View "Brown v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

Petitioners found allegedly defective plumbing parts in their residences. Petitioners provided Nev. Rev. Stat. Ch. 40 prelitigation notice to the general contractor/developer, Centex Homes, informing it of the alleged defect. Centex forwarded the notice to various subcontractors and suppliers, including Uponor, Inc. Uponor declined to make repairs. Petitioners filed a complaint against Centex, and Centex filed a third-party complaint against numerous subcontractors, including RCR Plumbing & Mechanical, Inc. RCR filed a fourth-party complaint against Uponor. The district court stayed the proceedings and directed RCR to provide Uponor notice of the construction defectsafter Uponor moved to dismiss the fourth-party complaint against it based on lack of notice. Once RCR provided notice, Uponor made repairs. Petitioners sought an extraordinary writ arguing that neither they nor RCR were required to give Uponor Chapter 40 notice and an opportunity to repair prior to RCR’s filing of its fourth-party complaint. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, holding that claimant homeowners or subcontractors are not required to give notice to other subcontractors, suppliers, or design professionals prior to commencing or adding an action against them. View "Barrett v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Medicare beneficiary who received his Medicare benefits through a plan offered by Respondents, health insurance businesses that specialize in health maintenance and/or managed care and are engaged in the joint venture of providing insurance. As a result of his treatment at a clinic, which was a contracted provider for Respondents, Plaintiff became infected with hepatitis C. Plaintiff subsequently sued Respondents alleging negligence in selecting their health care providers. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the federal Medicare Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state common law negligence claims regarding the retention and investigation of contracted Medicare providers are expressly preempted by the Medicare Act. View "Morrison v. Health Plan of Nev., Inc." on Justia Law

The question presented in this case was whether a person can burglarize his or her own home. Plaintiff was charged with burglary while in possession of a firearm and murder with the use of a deadly weapon for entering the home he owned and previously shared with his estranged wife and fatally shooting his wife. The district court ultimately dismissed the burglary charge, finding that one cannot legally burglarize his or her own home where there is no legal impediment or restraining order of some sort otherwise limiting the ability of the owner to access his or her own property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person cannot commit burglary of a home when he or she has an absolute right to enter the home. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiff underwent Lasik corrective surgery on her eyes and subsequently developed ocular complications. Plaintiff sued Dr. John L. Siems, who performed the surgery, and Siems Advanced Lasik, asserting claims for medical malpractice and professional negligence. During trial, the defense argued that Plaintiff’s condition was consistent with eye drop abuse. The jury returned a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain expert testimony because the testimony met the standard for expert testimony set forth in Williams v. Eighth Judicial District Court, which clarified existing law on medical expert testimony; and (2) the defense counsel’s direct, unauthorized communications with Plaintiff’s treating physician were improper, but because Plaintiff did not demonstrate prejudice, a new trial was not warranted. View "Leavitt v. Siems" on Justia Law