Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.207’s limitations period, which the Supreme Court has stated in the past does not commence for a malpractice action until the conclusion of the litigation in which the malpractice occured. Claimants filed suit against New Albertson’s, Inc. for damages. New Albertson’s hired Brady, Vorwerck, Ryder & Caspino (BVRC) for legal representation, and BVRC assigned attorney W. Dennis Richardson to the case. New Albertson’s eventually settled the case. Over two years after New Albertson’s settlement with the claimants, New Albertson’s filed an attorney malpractice action against BVRC and Richardson. The suit was removed to the federal district court, which concluded that New Albertson’s action against BVRC was timely. The federal district court then granted BVRC’s motion to certify the question to the Supreme Court of whether 1997 amendments to section 11.207(1) rendered the litigation malpractice tolling rule obsolete. The Supreme Court answered that the two-year statute of limitations in section 11.207, as revised by the Legislature in 1997, is tolled against a cause of action for attorney malpractice pending the outcome of the underlying lawsuit in which the malpractice allegedly occurred. View "Brady, Vorwerck, Ryder & Caspino v. New Albertson’s, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a timely post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied on the merits. Appellant later filed a second post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s petition was untimely and successive, but Appellant argued he had good cause to excuse the procedural bars because his first post-conviction counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to present these claims in his first post-conviction petition. At issue in this case was whether, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may constitute good cause under Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726(1) and Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810 to allow a noncapital petitioner to file an untimely and successive post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Martinez does not alter the Court’s prior decisions that a petitioner has no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel and that post-conviction counsel’s performance does not constitute good cause to excuse the statutory procedural bars unless the appointment of that counsel was mandated by statute. View "Brown v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

Petitioners found allegedly defective plumbing parts in their residences. Petitioners provided Nev. Rev. Stat. Ch. 40 prelitigation notice to the general contractor/developer, Centex Homes, informing it of the alleged defect. Centex forwarded the notice to various subcontractors and suppliers, including Uponor, Inc. Uponor declined to make repairs. Petitioners filed a complaint against Centex, and Centex filed a third-party complaint against numerous subcontractors, including RCR Plumbing & Mechanical, Inc. RCR filed a fourth-party complaint against Uponor. The district court stayed the proceedings and directed RCR to provide Uponor notice of the construction defectsafter Uponor moved to dismiss the fourth-party complaint against it based on lack of notice. Once RCR provided notice, Uponor made repairs. Petitioners sought an extraordinary writ arguing that neither they nor RCR were required to give Uponor Chapter 40 notice and an opportunity to repair prior to RCR’s filing of its fourth-party complaint. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, holding that claimant homeowners or subcontractors are not required to give notice to other subcontractors, suppliers, or design professionals prior to commencing or adding an action against them. View "Barrett v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Medicare beneficiary who received his Medicare benefits through a plan offered by Respondents, health insurance businesses that specialize in health maintenance and/or managed care and are engaged in the joint venture of providing insurance. As a result of his treatment at a clinic, which was a contracted provider for Respondents, Plaintiff became infected with hepatitis C. Plaintiff subsequently sued Respondents alleging negligence in selecting their health care providers. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the federal Medicare Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state common law negligence claims regarding the retention and investigation of contracted Medicare providers are expressly preempted by the Medicare Act. View "Morrison v. Health Plan of Nev., Inc." on Justia Law

The question presented in this case was whether a person can burglarize his or her own home. Plaintiff was charged with burglary while in possession of a firearm and murder with the use of a deadly weapon for entering the home he owned and previously shared with his estranged wife and fatally shooting his wife. The district court ultimately dismissed the burglary charge, finding that one cannot legally burglarize his or her own home where there is no legal impediment or restraining order of some sort otherwise limiting the ability of the owner to access his or her own property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person cannot commit burglary of a home when he or she has an absolute right to enter the home. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiff underwent Lasik corrective surgery on her eyes and subsequently developed ocular complications. Plaintiff sued Dr. John L. Siems, who performed the surgery, and Siems Advanced Lasik, asserting claims for medical malpractice and professional negligence. During trial, the defense argued that Plaintiff’s condition was consistent with eye drop abuse. The jury returned a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain expert testimony because the testimony met the standard for expert testimony set forth in Williams v. Eighth Judicial District Court, which clarified existing law on medical expert testimony; and (2) the defense counsel’s direct, unauthorized communications with Plaintiff’s treating physician were improper, but because Plaintiff did not demonstrate prejudice, a new trial was not warranted. View "Leavitt v. Siems" on Justia Law

Appellants filed this personal injury action against Jane Liles and her daughter, Susan Liles, for damages arising from a car accident in Nevada. Both Jane and Susan were California residents. At issue in this case was whether Jane, a nonresident defendant, was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The district court granted Jane’s motion to dismiss the complaint due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Jane was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada by virtue of (i) Susan’s unilateral use in Nevada of the vehicle involved in the car accident, (ii) the accident arising from Susan’s use of the vehicle, or (iii) Jane's motion to consolidate in a Nevada court the several cases stemming from the accident; but (2) Jane might be subject to jurisdiction in Nevada based on an interpleader action filed in Nevada by Jane’s insurance company. Remanded.View "Dogra v. Liles" on Justia Law

David and Kelli Nilsson, who were divorced, held a half interest in certain property in Reno as tenants in common. After the divorce, Kelli and the parties’ children lived on the property, and David lived elsewhere. Several years later, David filed for bankruptcy. On his schedule of real property assets, David claimed an interest in the Reno property as half-owner with Kelli. David then claimed the property as exempt from inclusion in his bankruptcy estate based in part on the homestead exemption. The bankruptcy trustee (Trustee) objected to the claimed exemption because David did not reside on the Reno property, David did not record a declaration of homestead, and David could not now record a valid declaration of homestead on the property. David responded that he could claim the exemption because his children still lived on the property. The bankruptcy court certified a question to the Nevada Supreme Court without ruling on the Trustee’s objection. The Court answered that a debtor must actually reside on real property in order to claim properly a homestead exemption for that property. View "In re Nilsson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexual assault and possession of child pornography. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence found on his computer pursuant to a search warrant because the warrant did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.045(5)’s requirement that a warrant include a statement of probable cause or have the affidavit supporting the warrant attached. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Allen, failure to comply with section 179.045(5) triggers exclusion despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s contrary holding in United States v. Grubbs; and (2) in this case, the search warrant’s failure to comply with section 179.045(5) mandated exclusion of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.View "State v. Kincade" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted on several charges, including burglary, grand larceny, and obtaining property under false pretenses. After his appeal, Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his judgment of conviction and sentence. Based on motions filed by Petitioner, including a motion for the appointment of post-conviction counsel, the district court entered an order designating Petitioner as a vexatious litigant and restricting his ability to file further documents in the district court. Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, concluding that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in designating Petitioner a vexatious litigant and entering the restrictive order. View "Jones v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law