Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

These consolidated appeals concerned orders issuing a preliminary injunction, appointing a temporary trustee, granting summary judgment, and awarding attorney fees in a trust action. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly granted summary judgment regarding the trust interpretation; (2) the district court correctly granted summary judgment regarding the trustee’s breach of fiduciary duties of impartiality and to avoid conflicts of interest, and consequently, attorney fees were warranted; and (3) the preliminary injunction merged with the final judgment and was therefore moot. View "In re W.N. Connell & Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust" on Justia Law

At issue in this consolidated matter was whether Nevada’s general slayer statutes apply to the Public Employees’ Retirement Act (PERS Act) for the purposes of determining payment of survivor benefits. The Supreme Court held (1) Nevada’s general slayer statutes are applicable to the PERS Act, and therefore, any person who kills their PERS-member spouse must be treated as if they predeceased the PERS-member spouse for the purposes of determining payment of survivor benefits (2) the Public Employees’ Retirement System of Nevada (PERS) is not exempt from paying prejudgment or post-judgment interest; (3) it is within the district court’s discretion to award up to $1,500 in reasonable costs for a non testifying expert consultant under Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.005(5); and (4) attorney fees should not have been awarded in this case under Nev. Rev. Stat. 7.085 and 18.010. View "Pub. Employees' Retirement System of Nevada v. Gitter" on Justia Law

Emil Frei and Adoria Frei, husband and wife, created an irrevocable trust (Trust) that was a spendthrift trust. The couple’s ten children were named equal beneficiaries under the Trust. After Adoria died, her son, Stephen Brock, successfully petitioned to modify the Trust with Emil’s consent. The petition proposed to alter the language controlling distribution of the Trust property, granting any beneficiary the right to compel distribution of his share of the Trust. The next year, Stephen settled several lawsuits that Emil and his children had brought against him. In the settlement, Stephen agreed to make payments to an alternate family trust, which he did not do. When Emil died, Stephen did not receive his share of the Trust funds. The trustee of the Trust used Stephen’s share of the Trust to pay a portion of his settlement debt. Stephen filed a petition to construe the terms of the Trust and compel repayment of the amount the trustee paid out on his behalf. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an irrevocable spendthrift trust may be modified by the survivor of two settlers and interested beneficiaries; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly determined that the modification and settlement were valid. View "In re Frei Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a district court order accepting jurisdiction over a trust with a situs in Nevada and finding personal jurisdiction over the investment trust advisor. The Supreme Court was asked to interpret Nev. Rev. Stat. 155.190(1)(h) and Nev. Rev. Stat. 163.555. The Supreme Court dismissed Christopher Davis’ appeal and denied his writ petition, holding (1) section 155.190(1)(h) only grants the Court appellate jurisdiction over the portion of an appealed order instructing or appointing a trustee and does not grant the Court appellate jurisdiction over all matters in an order instructing or appointing the trustee; and (2) persons accepting an appointment as an investment trust advisor for a trust with a situs in Nevada impliedly consent to personal jurisdiction in Nevada under section 163.5555. View "In re Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust" on Justia Law

Judgment creditor Far West Industries filed suit against Michael Mona, who, together with Rhonda Mona, was a co-trustee of a family trust. A California court found that Michael committed fraud and awarded Far West a $17.8 million judgment against Michael. Far West domesticated the California judgment in Nevada against Michael and the family trust. The Nevada district court requested to examine Rhonda and ordered the Monas to produce some of Rhonda’s personal financial documents. When the Monas did not produce the documents the district court sanctioned them pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 37 and concluded that the funds on Rhonda’s three bank accounts were subject to execution by Far West pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.320 to partially satisfy the judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the post-judgment sanctions order, holding that the district court erred in (1) ordering Rhonda to produce documents and appear for an examination regarding her personal finances without Far West proceeding against Rhonda in her individual capacity or without the court clerk issuing a subpoena and Far West serving the subpoena on Rhonda; and (2) ordering Rhonda’s personal bank accounts to be executed upon pursuant to rule 37 and section 21.320 and to be applied to partially satisfy the judgment. View "Mona v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

During the course of the guardianship proceedings involving the decedent’s estate in this case the district court entered several orders, including a distribution order. The previous guardian of the decedent’s estate later petitioned the district court for distribution of money held in an operating account associated with certain real property. The district court entered a stipulation and order without the participation, signature, or agreement of the decedent’s judgment creditor. At issue on appeal was whether Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.1365 or the district court’s distribution order governed the distribution of funds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) if the source of the funds is the sale of real property, Chapter 159 applies, and if the source of the funds was not the sale of the property, the district court must determine whether its distribution order or Chapter 159 applies, and the district court erred by failing to identify the source of the funds in the operating account; and (2) a valid stipulation requires mutual assent to its terms and either a signed writing indicating assent by the party against whom the stipulation is offered or the presence of all interested parties, and the district court in this case erred by approving the stipulation. View "In re Guardianship & Estate of Echevarria" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a timely post-probate will contest but failed to timely issue a citation to Respondent, the executor of the estate, in accordance with Nev. Rev. Stat. 137.090. Appellant filed a petition to enlarge time for issuing citations. The probate commissioner recommended that the petition be granted, determining that Nev. R. Civ. P. 6(b) and Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 2.25 granted the court discretion to extend the time limit for issuing citations. The district court dismissed the will contest, concluding that Rule 6(b) does not apply to statutory time limits. The court did not address whether Rule 2.25 applied in this matter. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order, holding (1) a failure to timely issue citations to the estate’s personal representative and the will’s devisees constitutes grounds for dismissal of a will contest; (2) Rule 6(b) does not apply to statutory time limits; but (3) the district court erred in failing to determine whether Petitioner demonstrated excusable neglect under Rule 2.25 when requesting an enlargement of time to issue the citations. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Black" on Justia Law

When Respondent was born, her birth certificate identified Decedent as her father. Decedent later married Respondent’s mother but never formally established or challenged his status as Respondent’s father. When Decedent died, Appellants, Decedent’s sister and nephew, filed an ex parte petition for appointment as special administrators of Decedent’s estate. The petition identified Decedent’s siblings and their issue as his heirs, and Respondent was identified as Decedent’s stepdaughter. The district court made Appellants co-administrators of the estate. Respondent then filed a petition for revocation of the letters of special administration and for appointment as the special administrator, arguing that, as Decedent’s child, she had priority in appointment. The probate commissioner suggested that the district court find Respondent was Decedent’s child and entitled to appointment as administrator. The district court ordered that the report and recommendation be fully accepted and adopted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) paternity contests in intestacy proceedings are governed by the Nevada Parentage Act; and (2) Appellants were time-barred by, and lacked standing under, the Nevada Parentage Act to challenge Respondent’s presumptive paternity. View "In re Estate of Murray" on Justia Law

Daisy Monzo gifted a condominium that she owned to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of her daughter, Charron Monzo. Daisy subsequently signed another deed transferring the condo back into her own name. Charron filed a petition seeking an order requiring Daisy to transfer the condo back to the trust. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Daisy, concluding that Daisy’s execution of the deed transferring title to the condo into the trust was based on unilateral mistakes. Charron then filed this original writ petition challenging the district court’s partial summary judgment order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) a donor may obtain relief from an erroneous gift if she proves by clear and convincing evidence that her intent was mistaken and not in accord with the donative transfer; (2) remedies available to correct such mistakes depend on the nature of the unilateral mistake in question; and (3) because it was uncertain what Daisy’s donative intent was at the time of the donative transfer, genuine issues of fact remained as to whether unilateral mistakes affected Daisy’s execution of the deed transferring the condo into the trust, and therefore, partial summary judgment was improper. View "In re Irrevocable Trust Agreement of 1979" on Justia Law

Appellant sued the trustee of his deceased wife's estate, claiming that the trustee improperly transferred Appellant's assets into the trust. Appellant also sought to disqualify the attorney who prepared the trust documents (Attorney) from representing the trustee based on the district court's conclusion that a prior attorney-client relationship existed between Appellant and Attorney, creating a conflict of interest. After the trust litigation settled, Appellant sued Attorney for legal malpractice due to Attorney's failure to verify Appellant's intentions before preparing he documents for his signature. Before trial, Appellant sought to preclude Attorney from arguing that an attorney-client relationship did not exist because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, Attorney could not deny the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The district court denied Appellant's motion. During trial, the district court ruled that evidence of Appellant's intent in executing the documents was precluded by the parol evidence rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly refused to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion because the issue of an attorney-client relationship between Appellant and Attorney was not necessarily litigated in the trust action; and (2) the district court did not err in applying the parol evidence rule. View " Frei v. Goodsell" on Justia Law