Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus in this medical malpractice action, holding that the relevant one-year statute of limitations expired and that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment.Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.097(2), a medical malpractice action against a healthcare provider must be filed within one year of the discovery of the injury or three years of the date of injury, whichever occurs first. At issue in this case was whether the limitations period was tolled for concealment where Plaintiffs were in possession of the necessary medical records to procure an expert affidavit more than one year prior to filing the complaint and the alleged concealment did not hinder the acquisition of the affidavit. The district court denied summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that questions of fact existed with respect to Defendants' alleged concealment. The Supreme Court granted extraordinary relief, holding that tolling was inapplicable and the complaint was untimely. View "Kushnir v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing Appellant's petition for judicial review challenging his dismissal from employment as a correctional officer and denying his amended petition for judicial review that correctly named all parties as respondents, holding that Prevost v. State, Department of Administration, 418 P.3d 675 (Nev. 2018) is overruled.In Prevost, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner's failure to name one party of record in the caption of a petition for judicial review was not jurisdictionally fatal under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(2)(a) because the petition named the missing respondent in the body of the petition and served the missing respondent with the petition. The Supreme Court overruled Prevost, holding (1) because Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(2)(a) plainly requires petitioners to name all parties as respondents, Prevost is overruled; (2) Appellant failed to strictly comply with section 233B.130(2)(a), and therefore, the district court correctly dismissed his petition; and (3) Appellant failed to timely filed his amended petition pursuant to section 233B.130(2)(d), and therefore, the district court correctly denied the motion to amend. View "Whitfield v. Nevada State Personnel Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing this action brought by Somersett Owners Association (SOA) seeking to recover damages against those involved in the design and construction of stacked retaining walls supporting the Somersett residential development in northern Nevada, holding that the statute of repose barred this lawsuit.After the rockery walls began failing, SOA brought suit against Defendants alleging negligence and negligence per se, breach of express and implied warranties and other claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the six-year period of repose set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.202 applied. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. At issue was when the rockery walls achieved "substantial completion" for purposes of section 11.202. The Supreme Court held (1) the six-year period in section 11.202 begins when the improvement to the real property is "substantially complete," which means sufficiently complete so that the owner can occupy or utilize the improvement; and (2) SOA failed to set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual issue as to whether it brought the underlying suit within the six-year period set by section 11.202. View "Somersett Owners Ass'n v. Somersett Development Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court holding that the Nevada Transportation Authority's (NTA) approval of Appellants' tax leases under Nev. Rev. Stat. 706.473 foreclosed further inquiry into their employee status, holding that the district court erred.Appellants, taxi drivers, sued Respondents, taxicab companies that leased taxicabs to Appellants under agreements approved by the NTA. Appellants alleged (1) their take-home pay was often less than the minimum hourly wage required by the Minimum Wage Amendment to the Nevada Constitution (MWA); and (2) notwithstanding the recital in the lease agreement that they were independent contractors, they were, in fact, employees under the "economic realities" test set forth in Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen's Club, 336 P.3d 951 (Nev. 2014). The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) employee status for purposes of the MWA is determined only by the "economic realities" test, but employee status for purposes of statutory waiting time penalties for late-paid wages may be affected by the presumption set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.0155; (2) a contractual recitation that a worker is not an employee is not conclusive under either test; and (3) the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of the NTA's approval of Appellants' leases. View "Myers v. Reno Cab Co." on Justia Law

In this opinion, the Supreme Court clarified that the existence of a bond pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 108.2415 precluded a contractor's ability to maintain a claim for unjust enrichment against the property owner because the subject of the dispute was governed by an express, written contract.University entered into an agreement with Lessee providing that University would purchase certain real property and lease it to Lessee, whereby Lessee would fund and construct student housing and other establishments. Lessee subsequently entered into a construction contract with Contractor. When a dispute arose between Contractor and Lessee, Contractor recorded a mechanics' lien against the property and filed a complaint against several defendants, including a claim against University for unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of University. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the bond provided an adequate remedy at law and that the unjust enrichment claim was improper. View "Korte Construction Co. v. State, Board of Regents" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition requesting a genetic market analysis and a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in denying the petition requesting genetic marker analysis and that the decision regarding the habeas petition must be vacated.Defendant was convicted of multiple crimes related to a fifteen-year-old girl's sexual assault and sentenced in 2011 to twenty-five years to life. In 2019, Defendant learned that a rape kit collected from the alleged victim and not tested prior to trial revealed a DNA match to a man other than Defendant. Defendant subsequently filed a postconviction motion requesting a genetic marker analysis and a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied both petitions. The Supreme Court remanded both matters for further proceedings, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that a CODIS match would have been inadmissible and in denying Defendant's petition requesting a genetic marker analysis on this basis; and (2) because the court erred in denying the genetic marker analysis petition, the court's decision regarding the habeas petition must be vacated. View "James v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part a writ of mandamus filed by Petitioners arguing that Dillon's Rule barred the underlying lawsuit, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 268.0035's limitations apply to a city's ability to litigate such that the city's power to maintain a lawsuit must be derived from an express grant of power or fall within a matter of local concern as defined by section 268.003(1).Section 268.0035(1), Nevada's modified version of Dillon's Rule, limits a city's powers to those expressly granted to it, those necessarily implied from an express grant of power, or those necessary to address matters of local concern. The City of Reno brought the underlying action against Petitioners, manufacturers and distributors of prescription opioid medications, to recover damages as a result of the opioid epidemic. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred under Dillon's Rule. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners then filed this writ petition arguing that Dillon's Rule barred the underlying lawsuit. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding that the modified Dillon's Rule applies to a city's ability to bring a lawsuit, and the district court misapplied the definition of a "matter of local concern." View "Endo Health Solutions, Inc. v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810(1)(a) does not bar a claim that a petition received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated stalking. The district court sentenced Defendant to three consecutive prison terms of sixty-two to 156 months. Defendant filed a timely postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective because the State breached the plea agreement and counsel did not object. The district court denied the petition, concluding that any issues regarding Defendant's sentence were outside the scope of section 34.810(1)(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 34.810 does not bar claims that counsel was ineffective at sentencing; and (2) the State materially breached its promise to recommend concurrent sentences, and counsel's failure to object prejudiced Defendant. View "Gonzales v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the State's motion for leave to proceed by information and this case and the judgment of the conviction, holding that a preliminary hearing transcript can satisfy Nev. Rev. Stat. 173.035(2)'s affidavit requirement.Section 173.035(2) allows the State to seek and obtain leave to proceed against an accused by information filed in district court upon a showing that the justice court committed egregious error in dismissing the charges. To obtain that leave, the district attorney must file a motion upon affidavit. The State in this case filed a criminal complaint against Defendant. The justice of the peace sua sponte dismissed all charges against him. Thereafter, the State sought leave to proceed against Defendant by information in district court and supported its motion by attaching a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript from justice court. The district court granted the motion unopposed. Defendant was subsequently convicted of several offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State's motion for leave to proceed by information in district court was substantially compliant with section 173.035(2) and demonstrated that the justice court committed egregious error in dismissing the charges against Defendant; and (2) substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Bolden v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of two counts each of sexual assault of a minor under fourteen years of age and lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen, holding that the cumulative effect of serious errors violated Defendant's due process right to a fair trial.During trial, the State presented no physical evidence to prove that Defendant committed the offenses. Still, the jury found Defendant guilty of all counts, and he was sentenced to serve an aggregate prison term totaling thirty-five years to life. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) a comment made by the district court undermining the presumption of innocence constituted judicial misconduct; (2) a juror committed misconduct by goggling the term "common sense," and prejudice resulted; (3) certain statements made by the prosecutor during the State's closing argument constituted misconduct; and (4) cumulative error warranted reversal. View "Gunera-Pastrana v. State" on Justia Law