Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing of an order affirming the judgment of the district court in the underlying quiet title action, holding that this Court did not overlook or misapprehend any material fact in the record.Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240 provides that ten years after a debt secured by a lien on real property has become "wholly due" and has remained unpaid, "it shall be conclusively presumed that the debt has been regularly satisfied and the lien discharged." At issue was what effect a notice of rescission has on the statute's ten-year time frame when it is recorded after a notice of default. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in this case consistent with its unpublished decision in Glass v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 78325, 2020 WL 3604042 at *1 (Nev. July 1, 2020). Appellant sought rehearing. The Supreme Court denied rehearing, holding that the Court did not overlook or misapprehend any material facts. View "SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction of multiple child sexual assault and abuse counts, holding that the district court's decision denying Appellant's motion to substitute counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.In this twenty-two-count criminal matter Appellant retained Mitchell Posin as defense counsel. On the eve of trial, Appellant filed a motion to substitute counsel, alleging that Posin failed adequately to prepare the defense. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Appellant of most of the counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court applied the wrong test in deciding Appellant's motion to substitute counsel because Posin was retained, not appointed; and (2) under the appropriate test, the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion to substitute counsel. View "Brass v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to Appellant's claim for declaratory relief and as to Appellant's accompanying violation of property rights claim, holding that public policy favors the adoption of sections 6.7 and 6.9 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes.At issue was the scope of a common-interest-community homeowners association's power to adopt rules restricting the design and use of individually-owned properties. In the instant case, Appellant argued that Respondent did not have any express power to adopt the architectural guidelines in question and argued that the district court should interpret an association's implied to adopt rules under Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 116 as being limited, consistent with sections 6.7 and 6.9. The district court ruled in favor of Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that this Court expressly adopts sections 6.7 and 6.9 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, the subject association possess the authority to adopt design-control restrictions for individually-owned property, but it must exercise that power reasonably. The Court remanded the case for the parties to address this issue. View "Moretto v. Elk Point Country Club Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by disqualifying a district court judge because her impartiality could reasonably be questioned after she reviewed notes, produced in discovery, that the Supreme Court later determined to be privileged, holding that the district court erred by disqualifying Judge Sturman.Lawrence and Heidi Canarelli, along with attorney Edward Lubbers, served as former trustees of an irrevocable trust. Lubbers, who later became sole trustee, entered into a purchase agreement to sell the trust's ownership in the former trustees' business entities. Scott Canarelli petitioned to compel Lubbers to provide an accounting related to the purchase agreement. Lubbers died before Scott could depose Lubbers. Because the former trustees had disclosed documents containing Lubbers' notes, they attempted to claw back the documents. Judge Sturman allowed Scott to retain portions of the notes, but the Supreme Court held that the notes were privileged and undiscoverable. The former trustees moved to disqualify Judge Sturman as biased because she reviewed the privileged notes. The motion was denied. The Supreme Court granted writ relief, holding that the district court improperly disqualified Judge Sturman where the record did not show that Judge Sturman's review of the notes created bias or prejudice against the former trustees that would prevent fair judgment. View "Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In this construction contract action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Helix Electric of Nevada, LLC's claims for retention against APCO Construction, Inc. and the award of attorney fees for APCO pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 68 for less than APCO's requested amount.Gemstone Development West, Inc. sought to construct condominiums and hired APCO as its general contractor. APCO subcontracted with Helix at Gemstone's direction. Helix was paid less than it billed, and the difference, $505,021, was withheld in retention. Under the subcontract, the retention would be released only upon the occurrence of several conditions. Later, the relationship between the parties soured, and the project was terminated. APCO, Helix, and other subcontractors recorded mechanics' liens against the property. After a trial, the district court dismissed Helix's claims for retention against APCO and granted attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that a subcontract provision conditioning the payment of funds on APCO first being paid was unenforceable, but the unenforceablity of the pay-if-paid condition did not also invalidate the remaining conditions precedent for obtaining the retention payment; and (2) none of the remaining arguments on appeal warranted reversal. View "Helix Electric of Nev., LLC v. APCO Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court awarding retroactive child support in a paternity action initiated after the child reached the age of majority, holding that the three-year statute of limitations to bring a paternity action after the child reaches the age of majority applies to a parent's request for retroactive child support.Mother and Father had one child together. More than one year after the child turned eighteen, Mother filed a paternity action against Father in order to seek back child support. Mother asked the district court to recognize the parties' previous agreement for $400 per month under Nev. Rev. Stat. 126.900(1) and alternatively argued that, even absent an agreement, she was entitled to retroactive child support. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Mother's request for retroactive child support was timely; (2) because Mother was permitted to seek retroactive child support the district court abused its discretion by concluding that it did not have the authority to grant relief; and (3) because Father did not make a promise in writing to make monthly support payments, the district court correctly denied Mother's section 126.900(1) claim. View "Hargrove v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) prohibits disclosure, under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), of documents from pharmaceutical companies and pharmacy benefit managers collected under S.B. 539.The Nevada Independent (TNI) filed a petition with the district court seeking an order directing the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to release the documents at issue. The district court concluded that the documents were not subject to disclosure under the NPRA because the information contained in them comprised trade secrets protected under the DTSA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the DTSA classifies the requested documents, obtained pursuant to S.B. 539, as confidential trade secrets, the documents were exempt from disclosure under the NPRA; and (2) TNI's remaining allegations of error were without merit. View "Nevada Independent v. Whitley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court correctly applied Nev. Rev. Stat. 231.1517 and ordered the Parole Board to credit Respondent for the time he spent incarcerated pending adjudication on his new criminal charges.The Division of Parole and Probation issued parole violation reports against Respondent based on new criminal charges. Respondent was remanded into the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and physically incarcerated in the prison. However, Respondent's parole revocation hearing was continued for more than one year until the day after he entered an Alford plea to the new charge of attempted burglary. Respondent received a consecutive sentence on the new charge and did not begin serving it until after he was parole on the previous charges. Respondent filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he lost over a year of credit for time served due to him. The district court agreed and granted relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Parole Board exceeded its authority by deferring the revocation hearing beyond sixty days after Respondent's return to the custody of NDOC. View "In re Application of Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied relief in this original petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner's motion and dismissing her complaint as to the party whom she failed timely to serve.Petitioner filed a complaint against Mark Thomas Anderson and his employer, Thor Development, LLC, alleging various tort claims arising out of a motor vehicle accident. After the expiration date of the Nev. R. Civ. P. 4 service period, Petitioner filed two motions to enlarge time for service. The district court granted the first motion but denied the second, finding that the motion was untimely. The court then dismissed Petitioners' complaint. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's subsequent request for relief, holding that Emergency Directive 009 did not toll the 120-day service period established by Rule 4(e), and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's second motion to enlarge time. View "Cervantes-Guevara v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting attorney fees in this guardianship case where the guardian requested the protected person's estate to pay attorney fees, holding that the award was proper and that the court acted within its discretion in setting the amount of the award.The fees at issue stemmed from a period in 2019 when Donna Simmons and Robyn Friedman served as temporary co-guardians for their mother, Kathleen June Jones. The district court formally discharged Donna and Robyn upon the appointment of Kimberly Jones as general guardian. Donna and Robyn sought attorney fees payable from Jones's estate. The district court granted the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the award was proper because the district court applied the relevant Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.344 factors and reasonably found that Donna and Robyn's complex temporary guardianship warranted compensation; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of fees to award. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law