Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this defamation action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's orders granting the anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss filed by Steve Sanson and Louis Schneider, holding that Sanson's allegedly defamatory statements regarding Jennifer Abrams' conduct at and following a family court proceeding against Schneider, opposing counsel, fell within the protection of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes but that the district court erred as to Sanson's private telephone statements to nonparty David Schoen.Schneider allegedly gave video of a closed-court hearing in the family law case to Sanson, who published articles on his website concerning Abrams' courtroom conduct and practices. The articles were sent to email subscribers and published through social media outlets. Abrams sued Sanson and Schneider alleging, inter alias, defamation. The district court granted Defendants' special motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Sanson met his burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and Abrams did not prove with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on her claims; and (2) the district court erred as to Sanson's statements to Schoen because private telephone conversations are not statements made in a place open to the public or in a public forum. View "Abrams v. Sanson" on Justia Law

In this defamation action, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, holding that the district court erred in finding that Defendant failed to satisfy prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis so as to shift the burden to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the claims should be allowed to proceed.Third-party comments posted to Defendant's Facebook page criticized Plaintiff for his handling of wild bears in his capacity as a biologist with the Nevada Department of Wildlife. Based on these comments, Plaintiff sued. Defendant moved to dismiss the claims pursuant to an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in determining that the comments at issue were not in the public interest and were not made in good faith and that Defendant met her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. View "Stark v. Lackey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to the Las Vegas Review-Journal (LVRJ), which had petitioned the district court to compel production of unreacted juvenile autopsy reports under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) after the Clark County Coroner's Office refused, holding that a governmental entity is not immune from an attorney fees award to which a prevailing records requester is entitled under Nev. Rev. Stat. 239.011.The Coroner's Office argued that it may refuse to disclose a juvenile autopsy report once it has provided the report to a Child Death Review (CDR) team and that juvenile autopsy reports may include sensitive information that may be properly redacted as privileged. The Coroner's Office further argued that action 239.012 immunizes a governmental entity from an award of attorney fees when that entity withholds public records in good faith. The Supreme Court held (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 423B.407(6)'s applies strictly to the CDR team as a whole; (2) the district court erred when it ordered the production of unreacted juvenile autopsy reports; and (3) the award of attorney fees must be vacated because it cannot yet be determined whether LVRJ is a prevailing party in its underlying NPRA action. View "Clark County Office of the Coroner v. Las Vegas Review-Journal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that a deed of trust beneficiary's agent was excused from making a formal tender, such that under Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113 (Nev. 2018), the ensuing foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust, holding that substantial evidence supported this finding.In Bank of America, the Supreme Court held that a deed of trust beneficiary can preserve its deed of trust by tendering the superpriority portion of a homeowners' association's (HOA) lien before the foreclosure sale is held. At issue was whether an offer to pay the superpriority amount when that amount is determined constitutes a tender sufficient to preserve the first deed of trust. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative but held that a formal tender is excused when evidence shows that the party entitled to payment had a known policy of rejecting such payments. Specifically, the Court held (1) the beneficiary was excused from making a formal tender because, pursuant to a known policy, its tender would have been rejected; and (2) therefore, the beneficiary preserved its interest in the property such that the property was purchased subject to the beneficiary's first deed of trust. View "7510 Perla Del Mar Ave Trust v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of mandamus sought by Petitioners, holding that Petitioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the complaint filed by the State Commissioner of Insurance because Nev. Rev. Stat. 78.138(7) applies to all claims of individual liability against directors and officers, precluding the imposition of liability for grossly negligent breaches of fiduciary duties.Petitioners formerly served as directors of a Nevada risk retention group. After a receivership action was filed, the district court entered a liquidation order appointing the Commissioner as receiver. As receiver, the Commissioner filed a complaint against Petitioners alleging claims of gross negligence and deepening insolvency. Petitioners filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that gross negligence cannot support a claim for personal liability against Petitioners pursuant to section 78.138. The district court denied the motion. Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the writ and directed the district court to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding (1) claims against individual directors and officers cannot proceed based only on allegations of gross negligence; and (2) the gross negligence-based allegations in the complaint failed to state an actionable claim under section 78.138(7). View "Chur v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's order denying a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking body cam footage and other related records regarding juveniles and then-State Senator Aaron Ford's interaction with the police due to the confidentiality of juvenile justice records, holding that the petition was correctly denied as to all portions of the bodycam footage but that the district court erred in granting the petition as to the other requested records.Officers with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) arrested numerous juvenile suspects after responding to an incident. Ford, a parent of one of the suspects, arrived at the scene. The Republican Attorneys General Association's (RAGA) requested records from LVMPD related to the incident in accordance with the Nevada Public Records Act. LVMPD refused the request, citing Nev. Rev. Stat. 62H.025 and 62H.030 to justify its assertion of confidentiality. RAGA petitioned for a writ of mandamus. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the district court (1) did not err in finding that all portions of requested bodycam footage contained confidential juvenile justice information; but (2) failed sufficiently to assess whether the other requested records contained any nonconfidential material. View "Republican Attorneys General Ass'n v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction and amended judgment of conviction convicting Defendant of first-degree murder and other crimes and denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that any error was harmless.A jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder, sexual assault, and burglary and denied Defendant's motions for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in admitting evidence of other bad acts; (2) did not violate Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause; (3) did not violate Defendant's due process right to a fair trial by admitting autopsy photographs; (4) did not deny Defendant a fair trial by invoking Nevada hearsay rules to exclude certain testimony; (5) erred by not allowing Defendant to introduce certain evidence, but the error was harmless; and (6) did not tolerate prosecutorial misconduct. Further, the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, and the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. View "Flowers v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal considering the preclusive effect of a qualified immunity decision where the federal district court's judgment addressed both prongs of the qualified immunity inquiry but the federal court of appeals addressed only one prong to affirm the judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment in favor of Defendants.Appellant filed this tort action in state court, asserting claims against FCH1, LLC and Jeannie Houston and against Officer Aaron Baca and other Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) officers. The defendants removed the case to federal district court. The federal judge concluded that Officer Baca was entitled to qualified immunity and that LVMPD could not be liable on the federal claims. The judge then dismissed the remaining state law claims. Before the appellate court issued its disposition affirming the judgment, Appellant refiled her state law claims against the defendants. The district court entered judgment for the defendants. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment to Officer Baca based on issue preclusion; (2) correctly granted summary judgment to LVMPD based on discretionary immunity; and (3) erred in granting summary judgment to FCH1 and Houston on the negligence and false imprisonment claims. View "Paulos v. FCH1, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Petitioner's petition to seal criminal records, holding that because the parties did not cite all of the proper statutes governing Petitioner's petition and the district court did not apply all of the controlling statutes the court erred in concluding that all of Petitioner's convictions were ineligible for sealing.At issue in this appeal was whether, if enough time elapses so that a petitioner's later conviction is sealed and deemed never to have occurred, that makes an earlier conviction eligible also to be sealed since it is no longer chronologically followed by another later conviction, even though it would not have been eligible prior to sealing the later conviction. The Supreme Court held (1) district courts have discretion to evaluate successive convictions in reverse chronological order, thereby potentially sealing earlier convictions that would not have been eligible had the court instead considered the convictions in forward chronological order; and (2) even if a later conviction has been sealed, the district court may still consider it in deciding whether earlier convictions should be sealed or not and in concluding whether the petitioner was truly rehabilitated. View "In re Application of Finley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' putative class action alleging that Respondents, current or former Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 107 trustees, engaged in unlicensed debt collection agency activities by pursuing nonjudicial foreclosures on their homes, holding that Appellants did not plead a cognizable cause of action.In dismissing the complaint the district court found that the plain language of Chapter 107 authorized the actions allegedly performed by Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the legislature did not intend that deed of trust trustees be subjected to Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 649 licensing requirements when they are engaged in nonjudicial foreclosures; and (2) because Appellants' allegations fell within the bounds of Chapter 107, Appellants did not plead a cognizable cause of action. View "Benko v. Quality Loan Service Corp." on Justia Law